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==Part II: On the Man Called Christ==
{{header
|title = [[The Everlasting Man]]
|author = Gilbert Keith Chesterton
|section = Conclusion and Appendices
|previous = [[../Part II, 6|VI. The Five Deaths of the Faith]]
|next =  
|notes =  
}}


__TOC__
==Conclusion: The Summary Of This Book==


===III. The Strangest Story in the World===
In the last chapter I have deliberately stressed what seems to be nowadays a
neglected side of the New Testament story, but nobody will suppose, I
imagine, that it is meant to obscure that side that may truly be called human.
That Christ was and is the most merciful of judges and the most sympathetic
of friends is a fact of considerably more importance in our own private lives
than in anybody's historical speculations. But the purpose of this book is to
point out that something unique has been swamped in cheap generalisations;
and for that purpose it is relevant to insist that even what was most universal
was also most original. For instance, we might take a topic which really is
sympathetic to the modern mood, as the ascetic vocations recently referred to
are not. The exaltation of childhood is something which we do really
understand; but it was by no means a thing that was then in that sense
understood. If we wanted an example of the originality of the Gospels we
could hardly take a stronger or more startling one. Nearly two thousand years
afterwards we happen to find ourselves in a mood that does really feel the
mystical charm of the child; we express it in romances and regrets about
childhood, in Peter Pan or The Child's Garden of Verses. And we can say of
the words of Christ with so angry an anti-Christian as Swinburne:--
;'No sign that ever was given
;To faithful or faithless eyes
;Showed ever beyond clouds riven
;So clear a paradise.
;Earth's creeds may be seventy times seven
;And blood have defiled each creed
;But if such be the kingdom of heaven
;It must be heaven indeed.'
But that paradise was not clear until Christianity had gradually cleared it. The
pagan world, as such, would not have understood any such thing as a serious
suggestion that a child is higher or holier than a man. It would have seemed
like the suggestion that a tadpole is higher or holier than a frog. To the merely
rationalistic mind, it would sound like saying that a bud must be more
beautiful than a flower or that an unripe apple must be better than a ripe one.
In other words, this modern feeling is an entirely mystical feeling. It is quite as
mystical as the cult of virginity; in fact it is the cult of virginity. But pagan
antiquity had much more idea of the holiness of the virgin than of the holiness
of the child. For various reasons we have come nowadays to venerate children,
perhaps partly because we envy children for still doing what men used to do;
such as play simple games and enjoy fairy-tales. Over and above this,
however, there is a great deal of real and subtle psychology in our appreciation
of childhood; but if we turn it into a modern discovery, we must once more
admit that the historical Jesus of Nazareth had already discovered it two
thousand years too soon. There was certainly nothing in the world around him
to help him to the discovery. Here Christ was indeed human; but more human
than a human being was then likely to be. Peter Pan does not belong to the
world of Pan but the world of Peter.
Even in the matter of mere literary style, if we suppose ourselves thus
sufficiently detached to look at it in that light, there is a curious quality to
which no critic seems to have done justice. It had among other things a
singular air of piling tower upon tower by the use of the a fortiori; making a
pagoda of degrees like the seven heavens. I have already noted that almost
inverted imaginative vision which pictured the impossible penance of the
Cities of the Plain. There is perhaps nothing so perfect in all language or
literature as the use of these three degrees in the parable of the lilies of the
field; in which he seems first to take one small flower in his hand and note its
simplicity and even its impotence; then suddenly expands it in flamboyant
colours into all the palaces and pavilions full of a great name in national
legend and national glory; and then, by yet a third overturn, shrivels into
nothing once more with a gesture as if flinging it away `and if God so clothes
the grass that today is and tomorrow is cast into the oven-- how much more' It
is like the building of a good Babel tower by white magic in a moment and in
the movement of a hand; a tower heaved suddenly up to heaven on the top of
which can be seen afar off, higher than we had fancied possible, the figure of
man; lifted by three infinities above all other things, on a starry ladder of light
logic and swift imagination. Merely in a literary sense it would be more of a
masterpiece than most of the masterpieces in the libraries; yet it seems to have
been uttered almost at random while a man might pull a flower. But merely in
a literary sense also, this use of the comparative in several degrees has about it
a quality which seems to me to hint of much higher things than the modern
suggestion of the simple teaching of pastoral or communal ethics. There is
nothing that really indicates a subtle and in the true sense a superior mind so
much as this power of comparing a lower thing with a higher and yet that
higher with a higher still; of thinking on three planes at once. There is nothing
that wants the rarest sort of wisdom so much as to see, let us say, that the
citizen is higher than the slave and yet that the soul is infinitely higher than the
citizen or the city. It is not by any means a faculty that commonly belongs to
these simplifiers of the Gospel; those who insist on what they call a simple
morality and others call a sentimental morality. It is not at all covered by those
who are content to tell everybody to remain at peace. On the contrary, there is
a very striking example of it in the apparent inconsistency between Christ's
sayings about peace and about a sword. It is precisely this power which
perceives that while a good peace is better than a good war, even a good war is
better than a bad peace. These far-flung comparisons are nowhere so common
as in the Gospels; and to me they suggest something very vast. So a thing
solitary and solid, with the added dimension of depth or height, might tower
over the flat creatures living only on a plane.
This quality of something that can only be called subtle and superior,
something that is capable of long views and even of double meanings, is not
noted here merely as a counterblast to the commonplace exaggerations of
amiability and mild idealism. It is also to be noted in connection with the more
tremendous truth touched upon at the end of the last chapter. For this is the
very last character that commonly goes with mere megalomania; especially
such steep and staggering megalomania as might be involved in that claim.
This quality that can only be called intellectual distinction is not, of course, an
evidence of divinity. But it is an evidence of a probable distaste for vulgar and
vainglorious claims to divinity. A man of that sort, if he were only a man,
would be the last man in the world to suffer from that intoxication by one
notion from nowhere in particular, which is the mark of the self-deluding
sensationalist in religion . Nor is it even avoided by denying that Christ did
make this claim. Of no such man as that, of no other prophet or philosopher of
the same intellectual order, would it be even possible to pretend that he had
made it. Even if the Church had mistaken his meaning, it would still be true
that no other historical tradition except the Church had ever even made the
same mistake. Mahomedans did not misunderstand Mahomet and suppose he
was Allah. Jews did not misinterpret Moses and identify him with Jehovah.
Why was this claim alone exaggerated unless this alone was made. Even if
Christianity was one vast universal blunder, it is still a blunder as solitary as
the Incarnation.
The purpose of these pages is to fix the falsity of certain vague and vulgar
assumptions; and we have here one of the most false. There is a sort of notion
in the air everywhere that all the religions are equal because all the religious
founders were rivals, that they are all fighting for the same starry crown. It is
quite false. The claim to that crown, or anything like that crown, is really so
rare as to be unique. Mahomet did not make it any more than Micah or
Malachi. Confucius did not make it any more that Plato or Marcus Aurelius.
Buddha never said he was Brahma. Zoroaster no more claimed to be Ormuz
than to be Ahriman. The truth is that, in the common run of cases, it is just as
we should expect it to be, in common sense and certainly in Christian
philosophy. It is exactly the other way. Normally speaking, the greater a man
is, the less likely he is to make the very greatest claim. Outside the unique case
we are considering, the only kind of man who ever does make that kind of
claim is a very small man; a secretive or self-centered monomaniac. Nobody
can imagine Aristotle claiming to be the father of gods and men, come down
from the sky; though we might imagine some insane Roman Emperor like
Caligula claiming it for him, or more probably for himself. Nobody can
imagine Shakespeare talking as if he were literally divine; though we might
imagine some crazy American crank finding it as a cryptogram in
Shakespeare's works, or preferably in his own works. It is possible to find here
and there human beings who make this supremely superhuman claim. It is
possible to find them in lunatic asylums; in padded cells; possibly in strait
waistcoats. But what is much more important than their mere materialistic fate
in our very materialistic society, under very crude and clumsy laws about
lunacy, the type we know as tinged with this, or tending towards it, is a
diseased and disproportionate type; narrow yet swollen and morbid to
monstrosity. It is by rather an unlucky metaphor that we talk of a madman as
cracked; for in a sense he is not cracked enough. He is cramped rather than
cracked; there are not enough holes in his head to ventilate it. This
impossibility of letting in daylight on a delusion does sometimes cover and
conceal a delusion of divinity. It can be found, not among prophets and sages
and founders of religions, but only among a low set of lunatics. But this is
exactly where the argument becomes intensely interesting; because the
argument proves too much. For nobody supposes that Jesus of Nazareth was
that sort of person. No modern critic in his five wits thinks that the preacher of
the Sermon on the Mount was a horrible half-witted imbecile that might be
scrawling stars on the walls of a cell. No atheist or blasphemer believes that
the author of the Parable of the Prodigal Son was a monster with one mad idea
like a cyclops with one eye. Upon any possible historical criticism, he must be
put higher in the scale of human beings than that. Yet by all analogy we have
really to put him there or else in the highest place of all.
In fact, those who can really take it (as I here hypothetically take it) in a quite
dry and detached spirit, have here a most curious and interesting human
problem. It is so intensely interesting, considered as a human problem, that it
is in a spirit quite disinterested, so to speak, that I wish some of them had
turned that intricate human problem into something like an intelligible human
portrait. If Christ was simply a human character, he really was a highly
complex and contradictory human character. For he combined exactly the two
things that lie at the two extremes of human variation. He was exactly what the
man with a delusion never is; he was wise; he was a good judge. What he said
was always unexpected; but it was always unexpectedly magnanimous and
often unexpectedly moderate. Take a thing like the point of the parable of the
tares and the wheat. It has the quality that unites sanity and subtlety. It has not
the simplicity of a madman. It has not even the simplicity of a fanatic. It might
be uttered by a philosopher a hundred years old, at the end of a century of
Utopias. Nothing could be less like this quality of seeing beyond and all round
obvious things, than the condition of the egomaniac with the one sensitive spot
on his brain. I really do not see how these two characters could be
convincingly combined, except in the astonishing way in which the creed
combines them. For until we reach the full acceptance of the fact as a fact,
however marvellous, all mere approximations to it are actually further and
further away from it. Divinity is great enough to be divine; it is great enough
to call itself divine. But as humanity grows greater, it grows less and less
likely to do so. God is God, as the Moslems say; but a great man knows he is
not God, and the greater he is the better he knows it. That is the paradox;
everything that is merely approaching to that point is merely receding from it.
Socrates, the wisest man, knows that he knows nothing. A lunatic may think
he is omniscience, and a fool may talk as if he were omniscient. But Christ is
in another sense omniscient if he not only knows, but knows that he knows.
Even on the purely human and sympathetic side, therefore, the Jesus of the
New Testament seems to me to have in a great many ways the note of
something superhuman; that is of something human and more than human. But
there is another quality running through all his teachings which seems to me
neglected in most modern talk about them as teachings; and that is the
persistent suggestion that he has not really come to teach. If there is one
incident in the record which affects me personally as grandly and gloriously
human, it is the incident of giving wine for the wedding-feast. That is really
human in the sense in which a whole crowd of prigs, having the appearance of
human beings, can hardly be described as human. It rises superior to all
superior persons. It is as human as Herrick and as democratic as Dickens. But
even in that story there is something else that has that note of things not fully
explained; and in a way here very relevant. I mean the first hesitation, not on
any ground touching the nature of the miracle, but on that of the propriety of
working any miracles at all, at least at that stage; 'my time is not yet come.'
What does that mean? At least it certainly meant a general plan or purpose in
the mind, with which certain things did or did not fit in. And if we leave out
that solitary strategic plan, we not only leave out the point of the story, but the
story.
We often hear of Jesus of Nazareth as a wandering teacher, and there is a vital
truth in that view in so far as it emphasises an attitude towards luxury and
convention which most respectable people would still regard as that of a
vagabond. It is expressed in his own great saying about the holes of the foxes
and the nests of the birds, and, like many of his great sayings, it is felt as less
powerful than it is, through lack of appreciation of that great paradox by which
he spoke of his own humanity as in some way collectively and representatively
human; calling himself simply the Son of Man; that is, in effect, calling
himself simply Man. It is fitting that the New Man or the Second Adam should
repeat in so ringing a voice and with so arresting a gesture the great fact which
came first in the original story, that man differs from the brutes by everything,
even by deficiency; that he is in a sense less normal and even less native; a
stranger upon the earth. It is well to speak of his wanderings in this sense and
in the sense that he shared the drifting life of the most homeless and hopeless
of the poor. It is assuredly well to remember that he would quite certainly have
been moved on by the police and almost certainly arrested by the police for
having no visible means of subsistence. For our law has in it a turn of humour
or touch of fancy which Nero and Herod never happened to think of, that of
actually punishing homeless people for not sleeping at home.
But in another sense the word 'wandering' as applied to his life is a little
misleading. As a matter of fact, a great many of the pagan sages and not a few
of the pagan sophists might truly be described as wandering teachers. In some
of them their rambling journeys were not altogether without a parallel in their
rambling remarks. Apollonius of Tyana, who figured in some fashionable cults
as a sort of ideal philosopher, is represented as rambling as far as the Ganges
and Ethiopia, more or less talking all the time. There was actually a school of
philosophers called the Peripatetics; and most even of the great philosophers
give us a vague impression of having very little to do except to walk and talk.
The great conversations which give us our glimpses of the great minds of
Socrates or Buddha or even Confucius often seem to be parts of a neverending
picnic; and especially, which is the important point, to have neither
beginning nor end. Socrates did indeed find the conversation interrupted by the
incident of his execution. But it is the whole point and the whole particular
merit, of the position of Socrates that death was only an interruption and an
incident. We miss the real moral importance of the great philosopher if we
miss that point; that he stares at the executioner with an innocent surprise, and
almost an innocent annoyance, at finding anyone so unreasonable as to cut
short a little conversation for the elucidation of truth. He is looking for truth
and not looking for death. Death is but a stone in the road which can trip him
up. His work in life is to wander on the roads of the world and talk about truth
for ever. Buddha, on the other hand, did arrest attention by one gesture; it was
the gesture of renunciation, and therefore in a sense of denial. But by one
dramatic negation he passed into a world of negation that was not dramatic;
which he would have been the first to insist was not dramatic. Here again we
miss the particular moral importance of the great mystic if we do not see the
distinction; that it was his whole point that he had done with drama, which
consists of desire and struggle and generally of defeat and disappointment. He
passes into peace and lives to instruct others how to pass into it. Henceforth
his life is that of the ideal philosopher; certainly a far more really ideal
philosopher than Apollonius of Tyana; but still a philosopher in the sense that
it is not his business to do anything but rather to explain everything; in his
case, we might almost say, mildly and softly to explode everything. For the
messages are basically different. Christ said 'Seek first the kingdom, and all
these things shall be added unto you.' Buddha said 'Seek first the kingdom, and
then you will need none of these things.'
Now compared to these wanderers the life of Jesus went as swift and straight
as a thunderbolt. It was above all things dramatic; it did above all things
consist in doing something that had to be done. It emphatically would not have
been done, if Jesus had walked about the world for ever doing nothing except
tell the truth. And even the external movement of it must not be described as a
wandering in the sense of forgetting that it was a journey. This is where it was
a fulfilment of the myths rather than of the philosophies; it is a journey with a
goal and an object, like Jason going to find the Golden Fleece, or Hercules the
golden apples of the Hesperides. The gold that he was seeking was death. The
primary thing that he was going to do was to die. He was going to do other
things equally definite and objective; we might almost say equally external
and material. But from first to last the most definite fact is that he is going to
die. No two things could possibly be more different than the death of Socrates
and the death of Christ. We are meant to feel that the death of Socrates was,
from the point of view of his friends at least, a stupid muddle and miscarriage
of justice interfering with the flow of a humane and lucid, I had almost said a
light philosophy. We are meant to feel that Death was the bride of Christ as
Poverty was the bride of St. Francis. We are meant to feel that his life was in
that sense a sort of love-affair with death, a romance of the pursuit of the
ultimate sacrifice. From the moment when the star goes up like a birthday
rocket to the moment when the sun is extinguished like a funeral torch, the
whole story moves on wings with the speed and direction of a drama, ending
in an act beyond words.
Therefore the story of Christ is the story of a journey, almost in the manner of
a military march; certainly in the manner of the quest of a hero moving to his
achievement or his doom. It is a story that begins in the paradise of Galilee, a
pastoral and peaceful land having really some hint of Eden, and gradually
climbs the rising country into the mountains that are nearer to the storm-clouds
and the stars, as to a Mountain of Purgatory. He may be met as if straying in
strange places, or stopped on the way for discussion or dispute; but his face is
set towards the mountain city. That is the meaning of that great culmination
when he crested the ridge and stood at the turning of the road and suddenly
cried aloud, lamenting over Jerusalem. Some light touch of that lament is in
every patriotic poem; or if it is absent, the patriotism stinks with vulgarity.
That is the meaning the stirring and startling incident at the gates of the
Temple, when the tables were hurled like lumber down the steps, and the rich
merchants driven forth with bodily blows; the incident that must be at least as
much of a puzzle to the pacifists as any paradox about non resistance can be to
any of the militarists. I have compared the quest to the journey of Jason, but
we must never forget that in a deeper sense it is rather to be compared to the
journey of Ulysses. It was not only a romance of travel but a romance of
return; and of the end of a usurpation. No healthy boy reading the story
regards the rout of the Ithacan suitors as anything but a happy ending. But
there are doubtless some who regard the rout of the Jewish merchants and
money changers with that refined repugnance which never fails to move them
in the presence of violence, and especially of violence against the well-to-do.
The point, here however, is that all these incidents have in them a character of
mounting crisis. In other words. these incidents are not incidental. When
Apollonius the ideal philosopher is brought before the judgement-seat of
Domitian and vanishes by magic, the miracle is entirely incidental. It might
have occurred at any time in the wandering life of the Tyanean; indeed, I
believe it is doubtful in date as well as in substance. The ideal philosopher
merely vanished, and resumed his ideal existence somewhere else for an
indefinite period. It is characteristic of the contrast perhaps that Apollonius
was supposed to have lived to an almost miraculous old age. Jesus of Nazareth
was less prudent in his miracles. When Jesus was brought before the
judgement-seat of Pontius Pilate, he did not vanish. It was the crisis and the
goal; it was the hour and the power of darkness. It was the supremely
supernatural act, of all his miraculous life, that he did not vanish.
Every attempt to amplify that story has diminished it. The task has been
attempted by many men of real genius and eloquence as well as by only too
many vulgar sentimentalists and self-conscious rhetoricians. The tale has been
retold with patronising pathos by elegant sceptics and with fluent enthusiasm
by boisterous best-sellers. It will not be retold here. The grinding power of the
plain words of the Gospel story is like the power of mill-stones; and those who
can read them simply enough will feel as if rocks had been rolled upon them.
Criticism is only words about words; and of what use are words about such
words as these? What is the use of word-painting about the dark garden filled
suddenly with torchlight and furious faces? 'Are you come out with swords
and staves as against a robber? All day I sat in your temple teaching, and you
took me not.' Can anything be added to the massive and gathered restraint of
that irony; like a great wave lifted to the sky and refusing to fall? 'Daughters of
Jerusalem, weep not for me but weep for yourselves and for your children.' As
the High Priest asked what further need he had of witnesses, we might well
ask what further need we have of words. Peter in a panic repudiated him: 'and
immediately the cock crew; and Jesus looked upon Peter, and Peter went out
and wept bitterly.' Has anyone any further remarks to offer. Just before the
murder he prayed for all the murderous race of men, saying, 'They know not
what they do'; is there anything to say to that, except that we know as little
what we say? Is there any need to repeat and spin out the story of how the
tragedy trailed up the Via Dolorosa and how they threw him in haphazard with
two thieves in one of the ordinary batches of execution; and how in all that
horror and howling wilderness of desertion one voice spoke in homage, a
startling voice from the very last place where it was looked for, the gibbet of
the criminal; and he said to that nameless ruffian, 'This night shalt thou be with
me in Paradise'? Is there anything to put after that but a full stop? Or is anyone
prepared to answer adequately that farewell gesture to all flesh which created
for his Mother a new Son?
It is more within my powers, and here more immediately to my purpose, to
point out that in that scene were symbolically gathered all the human forces
that have been vaguely sketched in this story. As kings and philosophers and
the popular element had been symbolically present at his birth, so they were
more practically concerned in his death; and with that we come face to face
with the essential fact to be realised. All the great groups that stood about the
Cross represent in one way or another the great historical truth of the time; that
the world could not save itself. Man could do no more. Rome and Jerusalem
and Athens and everything else were going down like a sea turned into a slow
cataract. Externally indeed the ancient world was still at its strongest; it is
always at that moment that the inmost weakness begins. But in order to
understand that weakness we must repeat what has been said more than once;
that it was not the weakness of a thing originally weak. It was emphatically the
strength of the world that was turned to weakness and the wisdom of the world
that was turned to folly.
In this story of Good Friday it is the best things in the world that are at their
worst. That is what really shows us the world at its worst. It was, for instance,
the priests of a true monotheism and the soldiers of an international
civilisation. Rome, the legend, founded upon fallen Troy and triumphant over
fallen Carthage, had stood for a heroism which was the nearest that any pagan
ever came to chivalry. Rome had defended the household gods and the human
decencies against the ogres of Africa and the hermaphrodite monstrosities of
Greece. But in the lightning flash of this incident, we see great Rome, the
imperial republic, going downward under her Lucretian doom. Scepticism has
eaten away even the confident sanity of the conquerors of the world. He who
is enthroned to say what is justice can only ask: 'What is truth?' So in that
drama which decided the whole fate of antiquity, one of the central figures is
fixed in what seems the reverse of his true role. Rome was almost another
name for responsibility. Yet he stands for ever as a sort of rocking statue of the
irresponsible. Man could do no more. Even the practical had become the
impracticable. Standing between the pillars of his own judgement-seat, a
Roman had washed his hands of the world.
There too were the priests of that pure and original truth that was behind all
the mythologies like the sky behind the clouds. It was the most important truth
in the world; and even that could not save the world. Perhaps there is
something overpowering in pure personal theism; like seeing the sun and
moon and sky come together to form one staring face. Perhaps the truth is too
tremendous when not broken by some intermediaries divine or human; perhaps
it is merely too pure and far away. Anyhow it could not save the world; it
could not even conquer the world. There were philosophers who held it in its
highest and noblest form; but they not only could not convert the world, but
they never tried. You could no more fight the jungle of popular mythology
with a private opinion than you could clear away a forest with a pocket-knife.
The Jewish priests had guarded it jealously in the good and the bad sense.
They had kept it as a gigantic secret. As savage heroes might have kept the sun
in a box, they kept the Everlasting in the tabernacle. They were proud that they
alone could look upon the blinding sun of a single deity; and they did not
know that they had themselves gone blind. Since that day their representatives
have been like blind men in broad daylight, striking to right and left with their
staffs, and cursing the darkness. But there has been that in their monumental
monotheism that it has at least remained like a monument, the last thing of its
kind, and in a sense motionless in the more restless world which it cannot
satisfy. For it is certain that for some reason it cannot satisfy. Since that day it
has never been quite enough to say that God is in his heaven and all is right
with the world, since the rumour that God had left his heavens to set it right.
And as it was with these powers that were good, or at least had once been
good, so it was with the element which was perhaps the best, or which Christ
himself seems certainly to have felt as the best. The poor to whom he preached
the good news, the common people who heard him gladly, the populace that
had made so many popular heroes and demigods in the old pagan world,
showed also the weaknesses that were dissolving the world. They suffered the
evils often seen in the mob of the city, and especially the mob of the capital,
during the decline of a society. The same thing that makes the rural population
live on tradition makes the urban population live on rumour. Just as its myths
at the best had been irrational, so its likes and dislikes are easily changed by
baseless assertion that is arbitrary without being authoritative. Some brigand
or other was artificially turned into a picturesque and popular figure and run as
a kind of candidate against Christ. In all this we recognise the urban
population that we know, with its newspaper scares and scoops. But there was
present in this ancient population an evil more peculiar to the ancient world.
We have noted it already as the neglect of the individual, even of the
individual voting the condemnation and still more of the individual
condemned. It was the soul of the hive; a heathen thing. The cry of this spirit
also was heard in that hour, 'It is well that one man die for the people.' Yet this
spirit in antiquity of devotion to the city and to the state had also been in itself
and in its time a noble spirit. It had its poets and its martyrs; men still to be
honoured for ever. It was failing through its weakness in not seeing the
separate soul of a man, the shrine of all mysticism; but it was only failing as
everything else was failing. The mob went along with the Sadducees and the
Pharisees, the philosophers and the moralists. It went along with the imperial
magistrates and the sacred priests, the scribes and the soldiers, that the one
universal human spirit might suffer a universal condemnation; that there might
be one deep, unanimous chorus of approval and harmony when Man was
rejected of men.
There were solitudes beyond where none shall follow. There were secrets in
the inmost and invisible part of that drama that have no symbol in speech; or
in any severance of a man from men. Nor is it easy for any words less stark
and single-minded than those of the naked narrative even to hint at the horror
of exaltation that lifted itself above the hill. Endless expositions have not come
to the end of it, or even to the beginning. And if there be any sound that can
produce a silence, we may surely be silent about the end and the extremity;
when a cry was driven out of that darkness in words dreadfully distinct and
dreadfully unintelligible, which man shall never understand in all the eternity
they have purchased for him; and for one annihilating instant an abyss that is
not for our thoughts had opened even in the unity of the absolute; and God had
been forsaken of God.
They took the body down from the cross and one of the few rich men among
the first Christians obtained permission to bury it in a rock tomb in his garden;
the Romans setting a military guard lest there should be some riot and attempt
to recover the body. There was once more a natural symbolism in these natural
proceedings; it was well that the tomb should be sealed with all the secrecy of
ancient eastern sepulture and guarded by the authority of the Caesars. For in
that second cavern the whole of that great and glorious humanity which we
call antiquity was gathered up and covered over; and in that place it was
buried. It was the end of a very great thing called human history; the history
that was merely human. The mythologies and the philosophies were buried
there, the gods and the heroes and the sages. In the great Roman phrase, they
had lived. But as they could only live, so they could only die; and they were
dead.
On the third day the friends of Christ coming at daybreak to the place found
the grave empty and the stone rolled away. In varying ways they realised the
new wonder; but even they hardly realised that the world had died in the night.
What they were looking at was the first day of a new creation, with a new
heaven and a new earth; and in a semblance of the gardener God walked again
in the garden, in the cool not of the evening but the dawn.
===IV. The Witness of the Heretics===
Christ founded the Church with two great figures of speech; in the final words
to the Apostles who received authority to found it. The first was the phrase
about founding it on Peter as on a rock; the second was the symbol of the keys.
About the meaning of the former there is naturally no doubt in my own case;
but it does not directly affect the argument here save in two more secondary
aspects. It is yet another example of a thing that could only fully expand and
explain itself afterwards, and even long afterwards. And it is yet another
example of something the very reverse of simple and self-evident even in the
language, in so far as it described a man as a rock when he had much more the
appearance of a reed.
But the other image of the keys has an exactitude that has hardly been exactly
noticed. The keys have been conspicuous enough in the art and heraldry of
Christendom; but not everyone has noted the peculiar aptness of the allegory.
We have now reached the point in history where something must be said of the
first appearance and activities of the Church in the Roman Empire; and for that
brief description nothing could be more perfect than that ancient metaphor.
The Early Christian was very precisely a person carrying about a key, or what
he said was a key. The whole Christian movement consisted in claiming to
possess that key. It was not merely a vague forward movement, which might
be better represented by a battering-ram. It was not something that swept along
with it similar or dissimilar things, as does a modern social movement. As we
shall see in a moment, it rather definitely refused to do so. It definitely asserted
that there was a key and that it possessed that key and that no other key was
like it; in that sense it was as narrow as you please. Only it happened to be the
key that could unlock the prison of the whole world; and let in the white
daylight of liberty.
The creed was like a key in three respects; which can be most conveniently
summed up under this symbol. First, a key is above all things a thing with a
shape. It is a thing that depends entirely upon keeping its shape. The Christian
creed is above all things the philosophy of shapes and the enemy of
shapelessness. That is where it differs from all that formless infinity,
Manichean or Buddhist, which makes a sort of pool of night in the dark heart
of Asia; the ideal of uncreating all the creatures. That is where it differs also
from the analogous vagueness of mere evolutionism, the idea of creatures
constantly losing their shape. A man told that his solitary latchkey had been
melted down with a million others into a Buddhistic unity would be annoyed.
But a man told that his key was gradually growing and sprouting in his pocket,
and branching into new wards or complications, would not be more gratified.
Second, the shape of a key is in itself a rather fantastic shape. A savage who
did not know it was a key would have the greatest difficulty in guessing what
it could possibly be. And it is fantastic because it is in a sense arbitrary. A key
is not a matter of abstractions; in that sense a key is not a matter of argument.
It either fits the lock or it does not. It is useless for men to stand disputing over
it, considered by itself; or reconstructing it on pure principles of geometry or
decorative art. It is senseless for a man to say he would like a simple key; it
would be far more sensible to do his best with a crowbar. And thirdly, as the
key is necessarily a thing with a pattern, so this was one having in some ways
a rather elaborate pattern. When people complain of the religion being so early
complicated with theology and things of the kind, they forget that the world
had not only got into a hole, but had got into a whole maze of holes and
corners. The problem itself was a complicated problem; it did not in the
ordinary sense merely involve anything so simple as sin. It was also full of
secrets, of unexplored and unfathomable fallacies, of unconscious mental
diseases, of dangers in all directions. If the faith had faced the world only with
the platitudes about peace and simplicity some moralists would confine it to, it
would not have had the faintest effect on that luxurious and labyrinthine
lunatic asylum. What it did do we must now roughly describe; it is enough to
say here that there was undoubtedly much about the key that seemed complex,
indeed there was only one thing about it that was simple. It opened the door.
There are certain recognised and accepted statements in this matter which may
for brevity and convenience be described as lies. We have all heard people say
that Christianity arose in an age of barbarism. They might just as well say that
Christian Science arose in an age of barbarism. They may think Christianity
was a symptom of social decay, as I think Christian Science a symptom of
mental decay. They may think Christianity a superstition that ultimately
destroyed a civilisation, as I think Christian Science a superstition capable (if
taken seriously) of destroying any number of civilisations. But to say that a
Christian of the fourth or fifth centuries was a barbarian living in a barbarous
time is exactly like saying that Mrs. Eddy was a Red Indian. And if I allowed
my constitutional impatience with Mrs. Eddy to impel me to call her a Red
Indian, I should incidentally be telling a lie. We may like or dislike the
imperial civilisation of Rome in the fourth century; we may like or dislike the
industrial civilisation of America in the nineteenth century; but that they both
were what we commonly mean by a civilisation no person of commonsense
could deny if he wanted to. This is a very obvious fact but it is also a very
fundamental one; and we must make it the foundation of any further
description of constructive Christianity in the past. For good or evil, it was
pre-eminently the product of a civilised age, perhaps of an over-civilised age.
This is the first fact apart from all praise or blame; indeed I am so unfortunate
as not to feel that I praise a thing when I compare it to Christian Science. But it
is at least desirable to know something of the savour of a society in which we
are condemning or praising anything; and the science that connects Mrs. Eddy
with tomahawks or the Mater Dolorosa with totems may for our general
convenience be eliminated. The dominant fact, not merely about the Christian
religion, but about the whole pagan civilisation, was that which has been more
than once repeated in these pages. The Mediterranean was a lake in the real
sense of a pool; in which a number of different cults or cultures were, as the
phrase goes, pooled. Those cities facing each other round the circle of the lake
became more and more one cosmopolitan culture. On its legal and military
side it was the Roman Empire, but it was very many-sided. It might be called
superstitious in the sense that it contained a great number of varied
superstitions; but by no possibility can any part of it be called barbarous.
In this level of cosmopolitan culture arose the Christian religion and the
Catholic Church; and everything in the story suggests that it was felt to be
something new and strange. Those who have tried to suggest that it evolved
out of something much milder or more ordinary have found that in this case
their evolutionary method is very difficult to apply. They may suggest that
Essenes or Ebionites or such things were the seed; but the seed is invisible; the
tree appears very rapidly full-grown; and the tree is something totally
different. It is certainly a Christmas tree in the sense that it keeps the
kindliness and moral beauty of the story of Bethlehem; but it was as ritualistic
as the seven-branched candlestick, and the candles it carried were considerably
more than were probably permitted by the first prayer-book of Edward the
Sixth. It might well be asked, indeed, why any one accepting the Bethlehem
tradition should object to golden or gilded ornament since the Magi
themselves brought gold, why he should dislike incense in the church since
incense was brought even to the stable. But these are controversies that do not
concern me here. I am concerned only with the historical fact, more and more
admitted by historians, that very early in its history this thing became visible to
the civilisation of antiquity; and that already the Church appeared as a Church;
with everything that is implied in a Church and much that is disliked in a
Church. We will discuss in a moment how far it was like other ritualistic or
magical or ascetical mysteries in its own time. It was certainly not in the least
like merely ethical and idealistic movements in our time. It had a doctrine; it
had a discipline; it had sacraments; it had degrees of initiation, it admitted
people and expelled people; it affirmed one dogma with authority and
repudiated another with anathemas. If all these things be the marks of
Antichrist, the reign of Antichrist followed very rapidly upon Christ.
Those who maintain that Christianity was not a Church but a moral movement
of idealists have been forced to push the period of its perversion or
disappearance further and further back. A bishop of Rome writes claiming
authority in the very lifetime of St. John the Evangelist; and it is described as
the first papal aggression. A friend of the Apostles writes of them as men he
knew and says they taught him the doctrine of the Sacrament, and Mr. Wells
can only murmur that the reaction towards barbaric blood-rites may have
happened rather earlier than might be expected. The date of the Fourth Gospel,
which at one time was steadily growing later and later, is now steadily
growing earlier and earlier; until critics are staggered at the dawning and
dreadful possibility that it might be something like what it professes to be. The
last limit of an early date for the extinction of true Christianity has probably
been found by the latest German professor whose authority is invoked by Dean
Inge. This learned scholar says that Pentecost was the occasion for the first
founding of an ecclesiastical, dogmatic, and despotic Church utterly alien to
the simple ideals of Jesus of Nazareth. This may be called, in a popular as well
as a learned sense, the limit. What do professors of this kind imagine that men
are made of? Suppose it were a matter of any merely human movement, let us
say that of the conscientious objectors. Some say the early Christians were
Pacifists; I do not believe it for a moment; but I am quite ready to accept the
parallel for the sake of the argument. Tolstoy or some great preacher of peace
among peasants has been shot as a mutineer for defying conscription; and a
little while afterwards his few followers meet together in an upper room in
remembrance of him. They never had any reason for coming together except
that common memory; they are men of many kinds with nothing to bind them,
except that the greatest event in all their lives was this tragedy of the teacher of
universal peace. They are always repeating his words, revolving his problems,
trying to imitate his character. The Pacifists meet at their Pentecost and are
possessed of a sudden ecstasy of enthusiasm and wild rush of the whirlwind of
inspiration, in the course of which they proceed to establish universal
Conscription, to increase the Navy Estimates, to insist on everybody going
about armed to the teeth and on all the frontiers bristling with artillery; the
proceedings concluded with the singing of 'Boys of the Bulldog Breed' and
'Don't let them scrap the British Navy.' That is something like a fair parallel to
the theory of these critics; that the transition from their idea of Jesus to their
idea of Catholicism could have been made in the little upper room at
Pentecost. Surely anybody's commonsense would tell him that enthusiasts who
only met through their common enthusiasm for a leader whom they loved,
would not instantly rush away to establish everything that he hated. No, if the
'ecclesiastical and dogmatic system' is as old as Pentecost it is as old as
Christmas. If we trace it back to such very early Christians we must trace it
back to Christ.
We may begin then with these two negations. It is nonsense to say that the
Christian faith appeared in a simple age; in the sense of an unlettered and
gullible age. It is equally nonsense to say that the Christian faith was a simple
thing; in the sense of a vague or childish or merely instinctive thing. Perhaps
the only point in which we could possibly say that the Church fitted into the
pagan world, is the fact that they were both not only highly civilised but rather
complicated. They were both emphatically many-sided; but antiquity was then
a many-sided hole, like a hexagonal hole waiting for an equally hexagonal
stopper. In that sense only the Church was many-sided enough to fit the world.
The six sides of the Mediterranean world faced each other across the sea and
waited for something that should look all ways at once. The Church had to be
both Roman and Greek and Jewish and African and Asiatic. In the very words
of the Apostle of the Gentiles, it was indeed all things to all men. Christianity
then was not merely crude and simple and was the very reverse of the growth
of a barbaric time. But when we come to the contrary charge, we come to a
much more plausible charge. It is very much more tenable that the Faith was
but the final phase of the decay of civilisation, in the sense of the excess of
civilisation; that this superstition was a sign that Rome was dying, and dying
of being much too civilised. That is an argument much better worth
considering; and we will proceed to consider it.
At the beginning of this book I ventured on a general summary of it, in a
parallel between the rise of humanity out of nature and the rise of Christianity
out of history. I pointed out that in both cases what had gone before might
imply something coming after; but did not in the least imply what did come
after. If a detached mind had seen certain apes it might have deduced more
anthropoids; it would not have deduced man or anything within a thousand
miles of what man has done. In short, it might have seen Pithecanthropus or
the Missing Link looming in the future, if possible almost as dimly and
doubtfully as we see him looming in the past. But if it foresaw him appearing
it would also foresee him disappearing, and leaving a few faint traces just as
he has left a few faint traces; if they are traces. To foresee that Missing Link
would not be to foresee Man, or anything like Man. Now this earlier
explanation must be kept in mind; because it is an exact parallel to the true
view of the Church; and the suggestion of it having evolved naturally out of
the Empire in decay.
The truth is that in one sense a man might very well have predicted that the
imperial decadence would produce something like Christianity. That is,
something a little like and gigantically different. A man might very well have
said, for instance, 'Pleasure has been pursued so extravagantly that there will
be a reaction into pessimism. Perhaps it will take the form of asceticism; men
will mutilate themselves instead of merely hanging themselves.' Or a man
might very reasonably have said, 'If we weary of our Greek and Latin gods we
shall be hankering after some eastern mystery or other; there will be a fashion
in Persians or Hindoos.' Or a man of the world might well have been shrewd
enough to say, 'Powerful people are picking up these fads; some day the court
will adopt one of them and it may become official.' Or yet another and
gloomier prophet might be pardoned for saying, 'The world is going down-hill;
dark and barbarous superstitions will return, it does not matter much which.
They will all be formless and fugitive like dreams of the night.'
Now it is the intense interest of the case that all these prophecies were really
fulfilled; but it was not the Church that fulfilled them. It was the Church that
escaped from them, confounded them, and rose above them in triumph. In so
far as it was probable that the mere nature of hedonism would produce a mere
reaction of asceticism it did produce a mere reaction of asceticism. It was the
movement called Manichean and the Church was its mortal enemy. In so far as
it would have naturally appeared at that point of history, it did appear; it did
also disappear, which was equally natural. The mere pessimist reaction did
come with the Manichees and did go with the Manichees. But the Church did
not come with them or go with them; and she had much more to do with them
going than with their coming. Or again, in so far as it was probable that even
the growth of scepticism would bring in a fashion of eastern religion, it did
bring it in; Mithras came from far beyond Palestine out of the heart of Persia,
bringing strange mysteries of the blood of bulls. Certainly there was
everything to show that some such fashion would have come in any case but
certainly there is nothing in the world to show that it would not have passed
away in any case. Certainly an Oriental fad was something eminently fitted to
the fourth or fifth century; but that hardly explains it having remained to the
twentieth century, and still going strong. In short, in so far as things of the kind
might have been expected then, things like Mithraism were experienced then;
but it scarcely explains our more recent experiences. And if we were still
Mithraists merely because Mithraic head-dresses and other Persian apparatuses
might be expected to be all the rage in the days of Domitian, it would almost
seem by this time that we must be a little dowdy.
It is the same, as will be suggested in a moment, with the idea of official
favouritism. In so far as such favouritism shown towards a fad was something
that might have been looked for during the decline and fall of the Roman
Empire, it was something that did exist in that Empire and did decline and fall
with it. It throws no sort of light on the thing that resolutely refused to decline
and fall; that grew steadily while the other was declining and falling; and
which even at this moment is going forward with fearless energy, when an
other aeon has completed its cycle and another civilisation seems almost ready
to fall or to decline.
Now the curious fact is this; that the very heresies which the early Church is
blamed for crushing testify to the unfairness for which she is blamed. In so far
as something deserved the blame, it was precisely the things that she is blamed
for blaming. In so far as something was merely a superstition, she herself
condemned that superstition. In so far as something was a mere reaction into
barbarism, she herself resisted it because it was a reaction into barbarism. In so
far as something was a fad of the fading empire, that died and deserved to die,
it was the Church alone that killed it. The Church is reproached for being
exactly what the heresy was repressed for being. The explanations of the
evolutionary historians and higher critics do really explain why Arianism and
Gnosticism and Nestorianism were born--and also why they died. They do not
explain why the Church was born or why she has refused to die. Above all,
they do not explain why she should have made war on the very evils she is
supposed to share.
Let us take a few practical examples of the principle; the principle that if there
was anything that was really a superstition of the dying empire, it did really
die with the dying empire; and certainly was not the same as the very thing
that destroyed it. For this purpose we will take in order two or three of the
most ordinary explanations of Christian origins among the modern critics of
Christianity. Nothing is more common, for instance, than to find such a
modern critic writing something like this: 'Christianity was above all a
movement of ascetics, a rush into the desert, a refuge in the cloister, a
renunciation of all life and happiness; and this was a part of a gloomy and
inhuman reaction against nature itself, a hatred of the body, a horror of the
material universe, a sort of universal suicide of the senses and even of the self.
It came from an eastern fanaticism like that of the fakirs and was ultimately
founded on an eastern pessimism, which seems to feel existence itself as an
evil.'
Now the most extraordinary thing about this is that it is all quite true; it is true
in every detail except that it happens to be attributed entirely to the wrong
person. It is not true of the Church; but it is true of the heretics condemned by
the Church. It is as if one were to write a most detailed analysis of the
mistakes and misgovernment of the ministers of George the Third, merely with
the small inaccuracy that the whole story was told about George Washington;
or as if somebody made a list of the crimes of the Bolshevists with no
variation except that they were all attributed to the Czar. The early Church was
indeed very ascetic in connection with a totally different philosophy; but the
philosophy of a war on life and nature as such really did exist in the world, if
the critics only knew where to look for it.
What really happened was this. When the Faith first emerged into the world,
the very first thing that happened to it was that it was caught in a sort of swarm
of mystical and metaphysical sects, mostly out of the East; like one lonely
golden bee caught in a swarm of wasps. To the ordinary onlooker, there did
not seem to be much difference, or anything beyond a general buzz; indeed in
a sense there was not much difference so far as stinging and being stung were
concerned. The difference was that only one golden dot in all that whirring
gold-dust had the power of going forth to make hives for all humanity; to give
the world honey and wax or (as was so finely said in a context too easily
forgotten) 'the two noblest things, which are sweetness and light.' The wasps
all died that winter; and half the difficulty is that hardly anyone knows
anything about them and most people do not know that they ever existed; so
that the whole story of that first phase of our religion is lost. Or, to vary the
metaphor, when this movement or some other movement pierced the dyke
between the east and west and brought more mystical ideas into Europe, it
brought with it a whole flood of other mystical ideas besides its own, most of
them ascetical and nearly all of them pessimistic. They very nearly flooded
and over-whelmed the purely Christian element. They came mostly from that
region that was a sort of dim borderland between the eastern philosophies and
the eastern mythologies, and which shared with the wilder philosophers that
curious crave for making fantastic patterns of the cosmos in the shape of maps
and genealogical trees. Those that are supposed to derive from the mysterious
Manes are called Manichean; kindred cults are more generally known as
Gnostic; they are mostly of a labyrinthine complexity, but the point to insist on
is the pessimism; the fact that nearly all in one form or another regarded the
creation of the world as the work of an evil spirit. Some of them had that
Asiatic atmosphere that surrounds Buddhism; the suggestion that life is a
corruption of the purity of being. Some of them suggested a purely spiritual
order which had been betrayed by the coarse and clumsy trick of making such
toys as the sun and moon and stars. Anyhow all this dark tide out of the
metaphysical sea in the midst of Asia poured through the dykes
simultaneously with the creed of Christ; but it is the whole point of the story
that the two were not the same; that they flowed like oil and water. That creed
remained in the shape of a miracle; a river still flowing through the sea. And
the proof of the miracle was practical once more; it was merely that while all
that sea was salt and bitter with the savour of death, of this one stream in the
midst of it a man could drink.
Now that purity was preserved by dogmatic definitions and exclusions. It
could not possibly have been preserved by anything else. If the Church had not
renounced the Manicheans it might have become merely Manichean. If it had
not renounced the Gnostics it might have become Gnostic. But by the very fact
that it did renounce them it proved that it was not either Gnostic or Manichean.
At any rate it proved that something was not either Gnostic or Manichean; and
what could it be that condemned them, if it was not the original good news of
the runners from Bethlehem and the trumpet of the Resurrection? The early
Church was ascetic, but she proved that she was not pessimistic, simply by
condemning the pessimists. The creed declared that man was sinful, but it did
not declare that life was evil, and it proved it by damning those who did. The
condemnation of the early heretics is itself condemned as something crabbed
and narrow; but it was in truth the very proof that the Church meant to be
brotherly and broad. It proved that the primitive Catholics were specially eager
to explain that they did not think man utterly vile; that they did not think life
incurably miserable; that they did not think marriage a sin or procreation a
tragedy. They were ascetic because asceticism was the only possible purge of
the sins of the world; but in the very thunder of their anathemas they affirmed
for ever that their asceticism was not to be anti-human or anti-natural; that
they did wish to purge the world and not destroy it. And nothing else except
those anathemas could possibly have made it clear, amid a confusion which
still confuses them with their mortal enemies. Nothing else but dogma could
have resisted the riot of imaginative invention with which the pessimists were
waging their war against nature; with their Aeons and their Demiurge, their
strange Logos and their sinister Sophia. If the Church had not insisted on
theology, it would have melted into a mad mythology of the mystics, yet
further removed from reason or even from rationalism; and, above all yet
further removed from life and from the love of life. Remember that it would
have been an inverted mythology, one contradicting everything natural in
paganism; a mythology in which Pluto would be above Jupiter and Hades hang
higher than Olympus; in which Brahma and all that has the breath of life
would be subject to Seeva, shining with the eye of death.
That the early Church was itself full of an ecstatic enthusiasm for renunciation
and virginity makes this distinction much more striking and not less so. It
makes all the more important the place where the dogma drew the line. A man
might crawl about on all fours like a beast because he was an ascetic. He might
stand night and day on the top of a pillar and be adored for being an ascetic,
but he could not say that the world was a mistake or the marriage state a sin
without being a heretic. What was it that thus deliberately disengaged itself
from eastern asceticism by sharp definition and fierce refusal, if it was not
something with an individuality of its own; and one that was quite different? If
the Catholics are to be confused with the Gnostics, we can only say it was not
their fault if they are. And it is rather hard that the Catholics should be blamed
by the same critics for persecuting the heretics and also for sympathising with
the heresy.
The Church was not a Manichean movement if only because it was not a
movement at all. It was not even merely an ascetical movement, because it
was not a movement at all. It would be nearer the truth to call it the tamer of
asceticism than the mere leader or loosener of it. It was a thing having its own
theory of asceticism, its own type of asceticism, but most conspicuous at the
moment as the moderator of other theories and types. This is the only sense
that can be made, for instance, of the story of St. Augustine. As long as he was
a mere man of the world, a mere man drifting with his time, he actually was a
Manichean. It really was quite modern and fashionable to be a Manichean. But
when he became a Catholic, the people he instantly turned on and rent in
pieces were the Manicheans. The Catholic way of putting it is that he left off
being a pessimist to become an ascetic. But as the pessimists interpreted
asceticism, it ought to be said that he left off being an ascetic to become a
saint. The war upon life, the denial of nature, were exactly the things he had
already found in the heathen world outside the Church, and had to renounce
when he entered the Church. The very fact that St. Augustine remains a
somewhat sterner or sadder figure than St. Francis or St. Teresa only
accentuates the dilemma. Face to face with the gravest or even grimmest of
Catholics, we can still ask, 'Why did Catholicism make war on Manichees, if
Catholicism was Manichean?'
Take another rationalistic explanation of the rise of Christendom. It is common
enough to find another critic saying, 'Christianity did not really rise at all; that
is, it did not merely rise from below; it was imposed from above. It is an
example of the power of the executive, especially in despotic states. The
Empire was really an Empire; that is, it was really ruled by the Emperor. One
of the Emperors happened to become a Christian. He might just as well have
become a Mithraist or a Jew or a Fire-Worshipper; it was common in the
decline of the Empire for eminent and educated people to adopt these eccentric
eastern cults. But when he adopted it, it became the official religion of the
Roman Empire; and when it became the official religion of the Roman
Empire, it became as strong, as universal and as invincible as the Roman
Empire. It has only remained in the world as a relic of that Empire; or, as
many have put it, it is but the ghost of Caesar still hovering over Rome.' This
also is a very ordinary line taken in the criticism of orthodoxy, to say that it
was only officialism that ever made it orthodoxy. And here again we can call
on the heretics to refute it.
The whole great history of the Arian heresy might have been invented to
explode this idea. It is a very interesting history often repeated in this
connection; and the upshot of it is in that in so far as there ever was a merely
official religion, it actually died because it was merely an official religion; and
what destroyed it was the real religion. Arius advanced a version of
Christianity which moved, more or less vaguely, in the direction of what we
should call Unitarianism; though it was not the same, for it gave to Christ a
curious intermediary position between the divine and human. The point is that
it seemed to many more reasonable and less fanatical; and among these were
many of the educated class in a sort of reaction against the first romance of
conversion. Arians were a sort of moderates and a sort of modernists. And it
was felt that after the first squabbles this was the final form of rationalised
religion into which civilisation might well settle down. It was accepted by
Divus Caesar himself and became the official orthodoxy; the generals and
military princes drawn from the new barbarian powers of the north, full of the
future, supported it strongly. But the sequel is still more important. Exactly as
a modern man might pass through Unitarianism to complete agnosticism, so
the greatest of the Arian emperors ultimately shed the last and thinnest
pretense of Christianity; he abandoned ever Arius and returned to Apollo. He
was a Caesar of the Caesars; a soldier, a scholar, a man of large ambitions and
ideals; another of the philosopher kings. It seemed to him as if at his signal the
sun rose again. The oracles began to speak like birds beginning to sing at
dawn; paganism was itself again; the gods returned. It seemed the end of that
strange interlude of an alien superstition. And indeed it was the end of it, so far
as there was a mere interlude of mere superstition. It was the end of it, in so far
as it was the fad of an emperor or the fashion of a generation. If there really
was something that began with Constantine, then it ended with Julian.
But there was something that did not end. There had arisen in that hour of
history, defiant above the democratic tumult of the Councils of the Church,
Athanasius against the world. We may pause upon the point at issue; because
it is relevant to the whole of this religious history, and the modern world
seems to miss the whole point of it. We might put it this way. If there is one
question which the enlightened and liberal have the habit of deriding and
holding up as a dreadful example of barren dogma and senseless sectarian
strife, it is this Athanasian question of the Co-Eternity of the Divine Son. On
the other hand, if there is one thing that the same liberals always offer us as a
piece of pure and simple Christianity, untroubled by doctrinal disputes, it is the
single sentence, 'God is Love.' Yet the two statements are almost identical; at
least one is very nearly nonsense without the other. The barren dogma is only
the logical way of stating the beautiful sentiment. For if there be a being
without beginning, existing before all things, was He loving when there was
nothing to be loved? If through that unthinkable eternity He is lonely, what is
the meaning of saying He is love? The only justification of such a mystery is
the mystical conception that in His own nature there was something analogous
to self-expression; something of what begets and beholds what it has begotten.
Without some such idea, it is really illogical to complicate the ultimate essence
of deity with an idea like love. If the moderns really want a simple religion of
love, they must look for it in the Athanasian Creed. The truth is that the
trumpet of true Christianity, the challenge of the charities and simplicities of
Bethlehem or Christmas Day never rang out more arrestingly and
unmistakably than in the defiance of Athanasius to the cold compromise of the
Arians. It was emphatically he who really was fighting for a God of Love
against a God of colourless and remote cosmic control; the God of the stoics
and the agnostics. It was emphatically he who was fighting for the Holy Child
against the grey deity of the Pharisees and the Sadducees. He was fighting for
that very balance of beautiful interdependence and intimacy, in the very
Trinity of the Divine Nature, that draws our hearts to the Trinity of the Holy
Family. His dogma, if the phrase be not misunderstood, turns even God into a
Holy Family.
That this purely Christian dogma actually for a second time rebelled against
the Empire, and actually for a second time refounded the Church in spite of the
Empire, is itself a proof that there was something positive and personal
working in the world, other than whatever official faith the Empire chose to
adopt. This power utterly destroyed the official faith that the Empire did adopt.
It went on its own way as it is going on its own way still. There are any
number of other examples in which is repeated precisely the same process we
have reviewed in the case of the Manichean and the Arian. A few centuries
afterwards, for instance, the Church had to maintain the same Trinity, which is
simply the logical side of love, against another appearance of the isolated and
simplified deity in the religion of Islam. Yet there are some who cannot see
what the Crusaders were fighting for; and some even who talk as if
Christianity had never been anything but a form of what they call Hebraism
coming in with the decay of Hellenism. Those people must certainly be very
much puzzled by the war between the Crescent and the Cross. If Christianity
had never been anything but a simpler morality sweeping away polytheism,
there is no reason why Christendom should not have been swept into Islam.
The truth is that Islam itself was a barbaric reaction against that very humane
complexity that is really a Christian character; that idea of balance in the deity,
as of balance in the family, that makes that creed a sort of sanity, and that
sanity the soul of civilisation. And that is why the Church is from the first a
thing holding its own position and point of view, quite apart from the accidents
and anarchies of its age. That is why it deals blows impartially right and left, at
the pessimism of the Manichean or the optimism of the Pelagian. It was not a
Manichean movement because it was not a movement at all. It was not an
official fashion because it was not a fashion at all. It was something that could
coincide with movements and fashions, could control them and could survive
them.
So might rise from their graves the great heresiarchs to confound their
comrades of to-day. There is nothing that the critics now affirm that we cannot
call on these great witnesses to deny. The modern critic will say lightly enough
that Christianity was but a reaction into asceticism and anti-natural spirituality,
a dance of fakirs furious against life and love. But Manes the great mystic will
answer them from his secret throne and cry, 'These Christians have no right to
be called spiritual; these Christians have no title to be called ascetics, they who
compromised with the curse of life and all the filth of the family. Through
them the earth is still foul with fruit and harvest and polluted with population.
Theirs was no movement against nature, or my children would have carried it
to triumph; but these fools renewed the world when I would have ended it with
a gesture.' And another critic will write that the Church was but the shadow of
the Empire, the fad of a chance Emperor, and that it remains in Europe only as
the ghost of the power of Rome. And Arius the deacon will answer out of the
darkness of oblivious `No, indeed, or the world would have followed my more
reasonable religion. For mine went down before demagogues and men defying
Caesar; and around my champion was the purple cloak and mine was the glory
of the eagles. It was not for lack of these things that I failed.' And yet a third
modern will maintain that the creed spread only as a sort of panic of hell-fire;
men everywhere attempting impossible things in fleeing from incredible
vengeance; a nightmare of imaginary remorse; and such an explanation will
satisfy many who see something dreadful in the doctrine of orthodoxy. And
then there will go up against it the terrible voice of Tertullian, saying, 'And
why then was I cast out; and why did soft hearts and heads decide against me
when I proclaimed the perdition of all sinners; and what was this power that
thwarted me when I threatened all backsliders with hell? For none ever went
up that hard road so far as I; and mine was the Credo Quia Impossible.' Then
there is the fourth suggestion that there was something of the Semitic secret
society in the whole matter; that it was a new invasion of the nomad spirit
shaking a kindlier and more comfortable paganism, its cities and its household
gods; whereby the jealous monotheistic races could after all establish their
jealous God. And Mahomet shall answer out of the whirlwind, the red
whirlwind of the desert, 'Who ever served the jealousy of God as I did or left
him more lonely in the sky? Who ever paid more honour to Moses and
Abraham or won more victories over idols and the images of paganism? And
what was this thing that thrust me back with the energy of a thing alive; whose
fanaticism could drive me from Sicily and tear up my deep roots out of the
rock of Spain? What faith was theirs who thronged in thousands of every class
a country crying out that my ruin was the will of God; and what hurled great
Godfrey as from a catapult over the wall of Jerusalem, and what brought great
Sobieski like a thunderbolt to the gates of Vienna? I think there was more than
you fancy in the religion that has so matched itself with mine.'
Those who would suggest that the faith was a fanaticism are doomed to an
eternal perplexity. In their account it is bound to appear as fanatical for
nothing, and fanatical against everything. It is ascetical and at war with
ascetics, Roman and in revolt against Rome, monotheistic and fighting
furiously against monotheism; harsh in its condemnation of harshness; a riddle
not to be explained even as unreason. And what sort of unreason is it that
seems reasonable to millions of educated Europeans through all the
revolutions of some sixteen hundred years? People are not amused with a
puzzle or a paradox or a mere muddle in the mind for all that time. I know of
no explanation except that such a thing is not unreason but reason; that if it is
fanatical it is fanatical for reason and fanatical against all the unreasonable
things. That is the only explanation I can find of a thing from the first so
detached and so confident, condemning things that looked so like itself,
refusing help from powers that seemed so essential to its existence, sharing on
its human side all the passions of the age, yet always at the supreme moment
suddenly rising superior to them, never saying exactly what it was expected to
say and never needing to unsay what it had said; I can find no explanation
except that, like Pallas from the brain of Jove, it had indeed come forth out of
the mind of God, mature and mighty and armed for judgement and for war.
===V. The Escape from Paganism===
The modern missionary, with his palm-leaf hat and his umbrella, has become
rather a figure of fun. He is chaffed among men of the world for the ease with
which he can be eaten by cannibals and the narrow bigotry which makes him
regard the cannibal culture as lower than his own. Perhaps the best part of the
joke is that the men of the world do not see that the joke is against themselves.
It is rather ridiculous to ask a man just about to be boiled in a pot and eaten, at
a purely religious feast, why he does not regard all religions as equally friendly
and fraternal. But there is a more subtle criticism uttered against the more oldfashioned
missionary; to the effect that he generalises too broadly about the
heathen and pays too little attention to the difference between Mahomet and
Mumbo-Jumbo. There was probably truth in this complaint, especially in the
past; but it is my main contention here that the exaggeration is all the other
way at present. It is the temptation of the professors to treat mythologies too
much as theologies; as things thoroughly thought out are seriously held. It is
the temptation of the intellectuals to take much too seriously the fine shades of
various schools in the rather irresponsible metaphysics of Asia. Above all it is
their temptation to miss the real truth implied in the idea of Aquinas contra
Gentiles or Athanasius contra mundum.
If the missionary says, in fact, that he is exceptional in being a Christian, and
that the rest of the races and religions can be collectively classified as heathen,
he is perfectly right. He may say it in quite the wrong spirit, in which case he
is spiritually wrong. But in the cold light of philosophy and history, he is
intellectually right. He may not be right minded, but he is right. He may not
even have a right to be right, but he is right. The outer world to which he
brings his creed really is some thing subject to certain generalisations covering
all its varieties, and is not merely a variety of similar creeds. Perhaps it is in
any case too much of a temptation to pride or hypocrisy to call it heathenry.
Perhaps it could be better simply to call it humanity. But there are certain
broad characteristics of what we call humanity while it remains in what we
call heathenry. They are not necessarily bad characteristics; some of them are
worthy of the respect of Christendom; some of them have been absorbed and
transfigured in the substance of Christendom. But they existed before
Christendom and they still exist outside Christendom, as certainly as the sea
existed before a boat and all round a boat; and they have as strong and as
universal and as unmistakable a savour as the sea.
For instance, all real scholars who have studied the Greek and Roman culture
say one thing about it. They agree that in the ancient world religion was one
thing and philosophy quite another. There was very little effort to rationalise
and at the same time to realise a real belief in the gods. There was very little
pretense of any such real belief among the philosophers. But neither had the
passion or perhaps the power to persecute the others save in particular and
peculiar cases; and neither the philosopher in his school nor the priest in his
temple seems ever to have seriously contemplated his own concept as covering
the world. A priest sacrificing to Artemis in Calydon did not seem to think that
people would some day sacrifice to her instead of to Isis beyond the sea; a
sage following the vegetarian rule of the Neo-Pythagoreans did not seem to
think it would universally prevail and exclude the methods of Epictetus or
Epicurus. We may call this liberality if we like; I am not dealing with an
argument but describing an atmosphere. All this, I say, is admitted by all
scholars; but what neither the learned nor the unlearned have fully realised,
perhaps, is that this description is really an exact description of all non-
Christian civilisation today; and especially of the great civilisations of the
East. Eastern paganism really is much more all of a piece, just as ancient
paganism was much more all of a piece, than the modern critics admit. It is a
many-coloured Persian Carpet as the other was a varied and tessellated Roman
pavement; but the one real crack right across that pavement came from the
earthquake of the Crucifixion.
The modern European seeking his religion in Asia is reading his religion into
Asia. Religion there is something different; it is both more and less. He is like
a man mapping out the sea as land; marking waves as mountains; not
understanding the nature of its peculiar permanence. It is perfectly true that
Asia has its own dignity and poetry and high civilisation. But it is not in the
least true that Asia has its own definite dominions of moral government, where
all loyalty is conceived in terms of morality; as when we say that Ireland is
Catholic or that New England was Puritan. The map is not marked out in
religions, in our sense of churches. The state of mind is far more subtle, more
relative, more secretive, more varied and changing, like the colours of the
snake. The Moslem is the nearest approach to a militant Christian; and that is
precisely because he is a much nearer approach to an envoy from western
civilisation. The Moslem in the heart of Asia almost stands for the soul of
Europe. And as he stands between them and Europe in the matter of space so
he stands between them and Christianity in the matter of time. In that sense the
Moslems in Asia are merely like the Nestorians in Asia. Islam, historically
speaking, is the greatest of the Eastern heresies. It owed something to the quite
isolated and unique individuality of Israel; but it owed more to Byzantium and
the theological enthusiasm of Christendom. It owed something even to the
Crusades. It owed nothing whatever to Asia. It owed nothing to the
atmosphere of the ancient and traditional world of Asia, with its immemorial
etiquette and its bottomless or bewildering philosophies. All that ancient and
actual Asia felt the entrance of Islam as something foreign and western and
warlike, piercing it like a spear.
Even where we might trace in dotted lines the domains of Asiatic religions, we
should probably be reading into them something dogmatic and ethical
belonging to our own religion. It is as if a European ignorant of the American
atmosphere were to suppose that each 'state' was a separate sovereign state as
patriotic as France or Poland; or that when a Yankee referred fondly to his
'home town' he meant he had no other nation, like a citizen of ancient Athens
or Rome. As he would be reading a particular sort of loyalty into America, so
we are reading a particular sort of loyalty into Asia. There are loyalties of
other kinds; but not what men in the West mean by being a believer, by trying
to be a Christian, by being a good Protestant or a practising Catholic. In the
intellectual world it means something far more vague and varied by doubts and
speculations. In the moral world it means something far more loose and
drifting. A professor of Persian at one of our great universities, so passionate a
partisan of the East as practically to profess a contempt for the West, said to a
friend of mine: 'You will never understand oriental religions, because you
always conceive religion as connected with ethics. This kind has really nothing
to do with ethics.' We have most of us known some Masters of the Higher
Wisdom, some Pilgrims upon the Path to Power, some eastern esoteric saints
and seers, who had really nothing to do with ethics. Something different,
something detached and irresponsible, tinges the moral atmosphere of Asia
and touches even that of Islam. It was very realistically caught in the
atmosphere of Hassan; and a very horrible atmosphere too. It is even more
vivid in such glimpses as we get of the genuine and ancient cults of Asia.
Deeper than the depths of metaphysics, far down in the abysses of mystical
meditations under all that solemn universe of spiritual things, is a secret, an
intangible and a terrible levity. It does not really very much matter what one
does. Either because they do not believe in a devil, or because they do believe
in a destiny, or because experience here is everything and eternal life
something totally different, but for some reason they are totally different. I
have read somewhere that there were three great friends famous in medieval
Persia for their unity of mind. One became the responsible and respected
Vizier of the Great King; the second was the poet Omar, pessimist and
epicurean, drinking wine in mockery of Mahomet; the third was the Old Man
of the Mountain who maddened his people with hashish that they might
murder other people with daggers. It does not really much matter what one
does.
The Sultan in Hassan would have understood all those three men; indeed he
was all those three men. But this sort of universalist cannot have what we call
a character; it is what we call a chaos. He cannot choose; he cannot fight; he
cannot repent; he cannot hope. He is not in the same sense creating something;
for creation means rejection. He is not, in our religious phrase, making his
soul. For our doctrine of salvation does really mean a labour like that of a man
trying to make a statue beautiful; a victory with wings. For that there must be a
final choice, for a man cannot make statues without rejecting stone. And there
really is this ultimate unmorality behind the metaphysics of Asia. And the
reason is that there has been nothing through all those unthinkable ages to
bring the human mind sharply to the point; to tell it that the time has come to
choose. The mind has lived too much in eternity. The soul has been too
immortal, in the special sense that it ignores the idea of mortal sin. It has had
too much of eternity, in the sense that it has not had enough of the hour of
death and the day of judgement. It is not crucial enough; in the literal sense
that it has not had enough of the cross. That is what we mean when we say that
Asia is very old. But strictly speaking Europe is quite as old as Asia; indeed in
a sense any place is as old as any other place. What we mean is that Europe
has not merely gone on growing older. It has been born again.
Asia is all humanity; as it has worked out its human doom. Asia, in its vast
territory, in its varied populations, in its heights of past achievement and its
depths of dark speculation, is itself a world; and represents something of what
we mean when we speak of the world. It is a cosmos rather than a continent. It
is the world as man has made it; and contains many of the most wonderful
things that man has made. Therefore Asia stands as the one representative of
paganism and the one rival to Christendom. But everywhere else where we get
glimpses of that mortal destiny, they suggest stages in the same story. Where
Asia trails away into the southern archipelagoes of the savages, or where a
darkness full of nameless shapes dwells in the heart of Africa, or where the
last survivors of lost races linger in the cold volcano of prehistoric America, it
is all the same story; sometimes perhaps later chapters of the same story. It is
men entangled in the forest of their own mythology; it is men drowned in the
sea of their own metaphysics. Polytheists have grown weary of the wildest of
fictions. Monotheists have grown weary of the most wonderful of truths.
Diabolists here and there have such a hatred of heaven and earth that they have
tried to take refuge in hell. It is the Fall of Man; and it is exactly that fall that
was being felt by our own fathers at the first moment of the Roman decline.
We also were going down that side road; down that easy slope; following the
magnificent procession of the high civilisations of the world.
If the Church had not entered the world then, it seems probable that Europe
would be now very much what Asia is now. Something may be allowed for a
real difference of race and environment, visible in the ancient as in the modern
world. But after all we talk about the changeless East very largely because it
has not suffered the great change. Paganism in its last phase showed
considerable signs of becoming equally changeless. This would not mean that
new schools or sects of philosophy would not arise; as new schools did arise in
Antiquity and do arise in Asia. It does not mean that there would be no real
mystics or visionaries; as there were mystics in Antiquity and are mystics in
Asia. It does not mean that there would be no social codes, as there were codes
in Antiquity and are codes in Asia. It does not mean that there could not be
good men or happy lives, for God has given all men a conscience and
conscience can give all men a kind of peace. But it does mean that the tone
and proportion of all these things, and especially the proportion of good and
evil things, would be in the unchanged West what they are in the changeless
East. And nobody who looks at that changeless East honestly, and with a real
sympathy, can believe that there is anything there remotely resembling the
challenge and revolution of the Faith.
In short, if classic paganism had lingered until now, a number of things might
well have lingered with it; and they would look very like what we call the
religions of the East. There would still be Pythagoreans teaching reincarnation,
as there are still Hindus teaching reincarnation. There would still be Stoics
making a religion out of reason and virtue, as there are still Confucians making
a religion out of reason and virtue. There would still be Neo-Platonists
studying transcendental truths, the meaning of which was mysterious to other
people and disputed even amongst themselves; as the Buddhists still study a
transcendentalism mysterious to others and disputed among themselves. There
would still be intelligent Apollonians apparently worshipping the sun-god but
explaining that they were worshipping the divine principle; just as there are
still intelligent Parsees apparently worshipping the sun but explaining that they
are worshipping the deity. There would still be wild Dionysians dancing on the
mountain as there are still wild Dervishes dancing in the desert. There would
still be crowds of people attending the popular feasts of the gods, in pagan
Europe as in pagan Asia. There would still be crowds of gods, local and other,
for them to worship. And there would still be a great many more people who
worshipped them than people who believed in them. Finally there would still
be a very large number of people who did worship gods and did believe in
gods; and who believed in gods and worshipped gods simply because they
were demons. There would still be Levantines secretly sacrificing to Moloch
as there are still Thugs secretly sacrificing to Kalee. There would still be a
great deal of magic; and a great deal of it would be black magic. There would
still be a considerable admiration of Seneca and a considerable imitation of
Nero; just as the exalted epigrams of Confucius could coexist with the tortures
of China. And over all that tangled forest of traditions growing wild or
withering would brood the broad silence of a singular and even nameless
mood; but the nearest name of it is nothing. All these things, good and bad,
would have an indescribable air of being too old to die.
None of these things occupying Europe in the absence of Christendom would
bear the least likeness to Christendom. Since the Pythagorean Metempsychosis
would still be there, we might call it the Pythagorean religion as we talk about
the Buddhist religion. As the noble maxims of Socrates would still be there,
we might call it the Socratic religion as we talk about the Confucian religion.
As the popular holiday was still marked by a mythological hymn to Adonis,
we might call it the religion of Adonis as we talk about the religion of
Juggernaut. As literature would still be based on the Greek mythology, we
might call that mythology a religion, as we call the Hindu mythology a
religion. We might say that there were so many thousands or millions of
people belonging to that religion, in the sense of frequenting such temples or
merely living in a land full of such temples. But if we called the last tradition
of Pythagoras or the lingering legend of Adonis by the name of a religion, then
we must find some other name for the Church of Christ.
If anybody says that philosophic maxims presented through many ages, or
mythological temples frequented by many people, are things of the same class
and category as the Church, it is enough to answer quite simply that they are
not. Nobody thinks they are the same when he sees them in the old civilisation
of Greece and Rome; nobody would think they were the same if that
civilisation had lasted two thousand years longer and existed at the present
day; nobody can in reason think they are the same in the parallel pagan
civilisation in the East, as it is at the present day. None of these philosophies
or mythologies are anything like a Church; certainly nothing like a Church
Militant. And, as I have shown elsewhere, even if this rule were not already
proved, the exception would prove the rule. The rule is that pre-Christian or
pagan history does not produce a Church Militant; and the exception, or what
some would call the exception, is that Islam is at least militant if it is not
Church. And that is precisely because Islam is the one religious rival that is
not pre-Christian and therefore not in that sense pagan. Islam was a product of
Christianity; even if it was a by-product; even if it was a bad product. It was a
heresy or parody emulating and therefore imitating the Church. It is no more
surprising that Mahomedanism had something of her fighting spirit than that
Quakerism had something of her peaceful spirit. After Christianity there are
any number of such emulations or extensions. Before it there are none.
The Church Militant is thus unique because it is an army marching to effect a
universal deliverance. The bondage from which the world is thus to be
delivered is something that is very well symbolised by the state of Asia as by
the state of pagan Europe. I do not mean merely their moral or immoral state.
The missionary, as a matter of fact, has much more to say for himself than the
enlightened imagine even when he says that the heathen are idolatrous and
immoral. A touch or two of realistic experience about Eastern religion, even
about Moslem religion, will reveal some startling insensibilities in ethics; such
as the practical indifference to the line between passion and perversion. It is
not prejudice but practical experience which says that Asia is full of demons as
well as gods. But the evil I mean is in the mind. And it is in the mind wherever
the mind has worked for a long time alone. It is what happens when all
dreaming and thinking have come to an end in an emptiness that is at once
negation and necessity. It sounds like an anarchy, but it is also a slavery. It is
what has been called already the wheel of Asia; all those recurrent arguments
about cause and effect or things beginning and ending in the mind, which
make it impossible for the soul really to strike out and go anywhere or do
anything. And the point is that it is not necessarily peculiar to Asiatics; it
would have been true in the end of Europeans--if something had not happened.
If the Church Militant had not been a thing marching, all men would have
been marking time. If the Church Militant had not endured a discipline, all
men would have endured a slavery.
What that universal yet fighting faith brought into the world was hope.
Perhaps the one thing common to mythology and philosophy was that both
were really sad; in the sense that they had not this hope even if they had
touches of faith or charity. We may call Buddhism a faith; though to us it
seems more like a doubt. We may call the Lord of Compassion a Lord of
Charity, though it seems to us a very pessimist sort of pity. But those who
insist most on the antiquity and size of such cults must agree that in all their
ages they have not covered all their areas with that sort of practical and
pugnacious hope. In Christendom hope has never been absent; rather it has
been errant, extravagant, excessively fixed upon fugitive chances. Its perpetual
revolution and reconstruction has at least been an evidence of people being in
better spirits. Europe did very truly renew its youth like the eagles; just as the
eagles of Rome rose again over the legions of Napoleon, or we have seen
soaring but yesterday the silver eagle of Poland. But in the Polish case ever
revolution always went with religion. Napoleon himself sought a
reconciliation with religion. Religion could never be finally separated even
from the most hostile of the hopes; simply because it was the very source of
the hopefulness. And the cause of this is to be found simply in the religion
itself. Those who quarrel about it seldom even consider it in itself. There is
neither space nor place for such a full consideration here; but a word may be
said to explain a reconciliation that always recurs and still seems to require
explanation.
There will be no end to the weary debates about liberalising theology, until
people face the fact that the only liberal part of it is really the dogmatic part. If
dogma is incredible, it is because it is incredibly liberal. If it is irrational, it can
only be in giving us more assurance of freedom than is justified by reason. The
obvious example is that essential form of freedom which we call free-will. It is
absurd to say that a man shows his liberality in denying his liberty. But it is
tenable that he has to affirm a transcendental doctrine in order to affirm his
liberty. There is a sense in which we might reasonably say that if man has a
primary power of choice, he has in that fact a super-natural power of creation,
as if he could raise the dead or give birth to the unbegotten. Possibly in that
case a man must be a miracle; and certainly in that case he must be a miracle
in order to be a man; and most certainly in order to be a free man. But it is
absurd to forbid him to be a free man and do it in the name of a more free
religion.
But it is true in twenty other matters. Anybody who believes at all in God must
believe in the absolute supremacy of God. But in so far as that supremacy does
allow of any degrees that can be called liberal or illiberal, it is self-evident that
the illiberal power is the deity of the rationalists and the liberal power is the
deity of the dogmatists. Exactly in proportion as you turn monotheism into
monism you turn it into despotism. It is precisely the unknown God of the
scientist, with his impenetrable purpose and his inevitable and unalterable law,
that reminds us of a Prussian autocrat making rigid plans in a remote tent and
moving mankind like machinery. It is precisely the God of miracles and of
answered prayers who reminds us of a liberal and popular prince, receiving
petitions, listening to parliaments and considering the cases of a whole people.
I am not now arguing the rationality of this conception in other respects; as a
matter of fact it is not, as some suppose, irrational; for there is nothing
irrational in the wisest and most well-informed king acting differently
according to the action of those he wishes to save. But I am here only noting
the general nature of liberality, or of free or enlarged atmosphere of action.
And in this respect it is certain that the king can only be what we call
magnanimous if he is what some call capricious. It is the Catholic, who has the
feeling that his prayers do make a difference, when offered for the living and
the dead, who also has the feeling of living like a free citizen in something
almost like a constitutional commonwealth. It is the monist who lives under a
single iron law who must have the feeling of living like a slave under a sultan.
Indeed I believe that the original use of the word suffragium, which we now
use in politics for a vote, was that employed in theology about a prayer. The
dead in Purgatory were said to have the suffrages of the living. And in this
sense, of a sort of right of petition to the supreme ruler, we may truly say that
the whole of the Communion of Saints, as well as the whole of the Church
Militant, is founded on universal suffrage.
But above all, it is true of the most tremendous issue; of that tragedy which has
created the divine comedy of our creed. Nothing short of the extreme and
strong and startling doctrine of the divinity of Christ will give that particular
effect that can truly stir the popular sense like a trumpet; the idea of the king
himself serving in the ranks like a common soldier. By making that figure
merely human we make that story much less human. We take away the point
of the story which actually pierces humanity; the point of the story which was
quite literally the point of a spear. It does not especially humanise the universe
to say that good and wise men can die for their opinions; any more than it
would be any sort of uproariously popular news in an army that good soldiers
may easily get killed. It is no news that King Leonidas is dead any more than
that Queen Anne is dead; and men did not wait for Christianity to be men, in
the full sense of being heroes. But if we are describing, for the moment, the
atmosphere of what is generous and popular and even picturesque, any
knowledge of human nature will tell us that no sufferings of the sons of men,
or even of the servants of God, strike the same note as the notion of the master
suffering instead of his servants. And this is given by the theological and
emphatically not by the scientific deity. No mysterious monarch, hidden in his
starry pavilion at the base of the cosmic campaign, is in the least like that
celestial chivalry of the Captain who carries his five wounds in the front of
battle.
What the denouncer of dogma really means is not that dogma is bad; but rather
that dogma is too good to be true. That is, he means that dogma is too liberal
to be likely. Dogma gives man too much freedom when it permits him to fall.
Dogma gives even God too much freedom when it permits him to die. That is
what the intelligent sceptics ought to say; and it is not in the least my intention
to deny that there is something to be said for it. They mean that the universe is
itself a universal prison; that existence itself is a limitation and a control; and it
is not for nothing that they call causation a chain. In a word, they mean quite
simply that they cannot believe these things; not in the least that they are
unworthy of belief. We say not lightly but very literally, that the truth has
made us free. They say that it makes us so free that it cannot be the truth. To
them it is like believing in fairyland to believe in such freedom as we enjoy. It
is like believing in men with wings to entertain the fancy of men with wills. It
is like accepting a fable about a squirrel in conversation with a mountain to
believe in a man who is free to ask or a God who is free to answer. This is a
manly and a rational negation for which I for one shall always show respect.
But I decline to show any respect for those who first of all clip the wings and
cage the squirrel, rivet the chains and refuse the freedom, close all the doors of
the cosmic prison on us with a clang of eternal iron, tell us that our
emancipation is a dream and our dungeon a necessity; and then calmly turn
round and tell us they have a freer thought and a more liberal theology.
The moral of all this is an old one; that religion is revelation. In other words it
is a vision, and a vision received by faith; but it is a vision of reality. The faith
consists in a conviction of its reality. That, for example, is the difference
between a vision and a day-dream. And that is the difference between religion
and mythology. That is the difference between faith and all that fancy-work,
quite human and more or less healthy, which we considered under the head of
mythology. There is something in the reasonable use of the very word vision
that implies two things about it; first that it comes very rarely, possibly that it
comes only once; and secondly that it probably comes once and for all. A daydream
may come every day. A day-dream may be different every day. It is
something more than the difference between telling ghost-stories and meeting
a ghost.
But if it is not a mythology neither is it a philosophy. It is not a philosophy
because, being a vision, it is not a pattern but a picture. It is not one of those
simplifications which resolve everything into an abstract explanation; as that
everything is recurrent; or everything is relative; or everything is inevitable; or
everything is illusive. It is not a process but a story. It has proportions, of the
sort seen in a picture or a story; it has not the regular repetitions of a pattern or
a process; but it replaces them by being convincing as a picture or a story is
convincing. In other words, it is exactly, as the phrase goes, like life. For
indeed it is life. An example of what is meant here might well be found in the
treatment of the problem of evil. It is easy enough to make a plan of life of
which the background is black, as the pessimists do; and then admit a speck or
two of star-dust more or less accidental, or at least in the literal sense
insignificant. And it is easy enough to make another plan on white paper, as
the Christian Scientists do, and explain or explain away somehow such dots or
smudges as may be difficult to deny. Lastly it is easiest of all perhaps, to say
as the dualists do, that life is like a chess-board in which the two are equal, and
can as truly be said to consist of white squares on a black board or of black
squares on a white board. But every man feels in his heart that none of these
three paper plans is like life; that none of these worlds is one in which he can
live. Something tells him that the ultimate idea of a world is not bad or even
neutral; staring at the sky or the grass or the truths of mathematics or even a
new-laid egg, he has a vague feeling like the shadow of that saying of the great
Christian philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas, 'Every existence, as such, is good.'
On the other hand, something else tells him that it is unmanly and debased and
even diseased to minimise evil to a dot or even a blot. He realises that
optimism is morbid. It is if possible even more morbid than pessimism. These
vague but healthy feelings, if he followed them out, would result in the idea
that evil is in some way an exception but an enormous exception; and
ultimately that evil is an invasion or yet more truly a rebellion. He does not
think that everything is right or that every thing is wrong, or that everything is
equally right and wrong. But he does think that right has a right to be right and
therefore a right to be there, and wrong has no right to be wrong and therefore
no right to be there. It is the prince of the world; but it is also a usurper. So he
will apprehend vaguely what the vision will give to him vividly; no less than
all that strange story of treason in heaven and the great desertion by which evil
damaged and tried to destroy a cosmos that it could not create. It is a very
strange story and its proportions and its lines and colours are as arbitrary and
absolute as the artistic composition of a picture. It is a vision which we do in
fact symbolise in pictures by titanic limbs and passionate tints of plumage; all
that abysmal vision of falling stars and the peacock panoplies of the night. But
that strange story has one small advantage over the diagrams. It is like life.
Another example might be found, not in the problem of evil, but in what is
called the problem of progress. One of the ablest agnostics of the age once
asked me whether I thought mankind grew better or grew worse or remained
the same. He was confident that the alternative covered all possibilities. He did
not see that it only covered patterns and not pictures; processes and not stories.
I asked him whether he thought that Mr. Smith of Golder's Green got better or
worse or remained exactly the same between the age of thirty and forty. It then
seemed to dawn on him that it would rather depend on Mr. Smith; and how he
chose to go on. It had never occurred to him that it might depend on how
mankind chose to go on; and that its course was not a straight line or an
upward or downward curve, but a track like that of a man across a valley,
going where he liked and stopping where he chose, going into a church or
falling down in a ditch. The life of man is a story; an adventure story; and in
our vision the same is true even of the story of God.
The Catholic faith is the reconciliation because it is the realisation both of
mythology and philosophy. It is a story and in that sense one of a hundred
stories; only it is a true story. It is a philosophy and in that sense one of a
hundred philosophies; only it is a philosophy that is like life. But above all, it
is a reconciliation because it is something that can only be called the
philosophy of stories. That normal narrative instinct which produced all the
fairy tales is something that is neglected by all the philosophies--except one.
The Faith is the justification of that popular instinct; the finding of a
philosophy for it or the analysis of the philosophy in it. Exactly as a man in an
adventure story has to pass various tests to save his life, so the man in this
philosophy has to pass several tests and save his soul. In both there is an idea
of free will operating under conditions of design; in other words, there is an
aim and it is the business of a man to aim at it; we therefore watch to see
whether he will hit it. Now this deep and democratic and dramatic instinct is
derided and dismissed in all the other philosophies. For all the other
philosophies avowedly end where they begin; and it is the definition of a story
that it ends differently; that it begins in one place and ends in another. From
Buddha and his wheel to Akhen Aten and his disc, from Pythagoras with his
abstraction of number to Confucius with his religion of routine, there is not
one of them that does not in some way sin against the soul of a story. There is
none of them that really grasps this human notion of the tale, the test, the
adventure; the ordeal of the free man. Each of them starves the story-telling
instinct, so to speak, and does something to spoil human life considered as a
romance; either by fatalism (pessimist or optimist) and that destiny that is the
death of adventure; or by indifference and that detachment that is the death of
drama; or by a fundamental scepticism that dissolves the actors into atoms; or
by a materialistic limitation blocking the vista of moral consequences; or a
mechanical recurrence making even moral tests monotonous; or a bottomless
relativity making even practical tests insecure. There is such a thing as a
human story; and there is such a thing as the divine story which is also a
human story; but there is no such thing as a Hegelian story or a Monist story or
a relativist story or a determinist story; for every story, yes, even a penny
dreadful or a cheap novelette, has something in it that belongs to our universe
and not theirs. Every short story does truly begin with creation and end with a
last judgement.
And that is the reason why the myths and the philosophers were at war until
Christ came. That is why the Athenian democracy killed Socrates out of
respect for the gods; and why every strolling sophist gave himself the airs of a
Socrates whenever he could talk in a superior fashion of the gods; and why the
heretic Pharaoh wrecked his huge idols and temples for an abstraction and why
the priests could return in triumph and trample his dynasty under foot; and
why Buddhism had to divide itself from Brahminism, and why in every age
and country outside Christendom there has been a feud for ever between the
philosopher and the priest. It is easy enough to say that the philosopher is
generally the more rational; it is easier still to forget that the priest is always
the more popular. For the priest told the people stories; and the philosopher did
not understand the philosophy of stories. It came into the world with the story
of Christ.
And this is why it had to be a revelation or vision given from above. Any one
who will think of the theory of stories or pictures will easily see the point. The
true story of the world must be told by somebody to somebody else. By the
very nature of a story it cannot be left to occur to anybody. A story has
proportions, variations, surprises, particular dispositions, which cannot be
worked out by rule in the abstract, like a sum. We could not deduce whether or
no Achilles would give back the body of Hector from a Pythagorean theory of
number or recurrence; and we could not infer for ourselves in what way the
world would get back the body of Christ, merely from being told that all things
go round and round upon the wheel of Buddha. A man might perhaps work out
a proposition of Euclid without having heard of Euclid; but he would not work
out the precise legend of Eurydice without having heard of Eurydice. At any
rate he would not be certain how the story would end and whether Orpheus
was ultimately defeated. Still less could he guess the end of our story; or the
legend of our Orpheus rising, not defeated from, the dead.
To sum up; the sanity of the world was restored and the soul of man offered
salvation by something which did indeed satisfy the two warring tendencies of
the past; which had never been satisfied in full and most certainly never
satisfied together. It met the mythological search for romance by being a story
and the philosophical search for truth by being a true story. That is why the
ideal figure had to be a historical character, as nobody had ever felt Adonis or
Pan to be a historical character. But that is also why the historical character
had to be the ideal figure; and even fulfil many of the functions given to these
other ideal figures; why he was at once the sacrifice and the feast, why he
could be shown under the emblems of the growing vine or the rising sun. The
more deeply we think of the matter the more we shall conclude that, if there be
indeed a God, his creation could hardly have reached any other culmination
than this granting of a real romance to the world. Otherwise the two sides of
the human mind could never have touched at all; and the brain of man would
have remained cloven and double; one lobe of it dreaming impossible dreams
and the other repeating invariable calculations. The picture-makers would have
remained forever painting the portrait of nobody. The sages would have
remained for ever adding up numerals that came to nothing. It was that abyss
that nothing but an incarnation could cover; a divine embodiment of our
dreams; and he stands above that chasm whose name is more than priest and
older even than Christendom; Pontifex Maximus, the mightiest maker of a
bridge.
But even with that we return to the more specially Christian symbol in the
same tradition; the perfect pattern of the keys. This is a historical and not a
theological outline, and it is not my duty here to defend in detail that theology,
but merely to point out that it could not even be justified in design without
being justified in detail--like a key. Beyond the broad suggestion of this
chapter I attempt no apologetic about why the creed should be accepted. But in
answer to the historical query of why it was accepted and is accepted, I answer
for millions of others in my reply; because it fits the lock, because it is like
life. It is one among many stories; only it happens to be a true story. It is one
among many philosophies; only it happens to be the truth. We accept it; and
the ground is solid under our feet and the road is open before us. It does not
imprison us in a dream of destiny or a consciousness of the universal delusion.
It opens to us not only incredible heavens but what seems to some an equally
incredible earth, and makes it credible. This is the sort of truth that is hard to
explain because it is a fact; but it is a fact to which we can call witnesses. We
are Christians and Catholics not because we worship a key, but because we
have passed a door; and felt the wind that is the trumpet of liberty blow over
the land of the living.
===VI. The Five Deaths of the Faith===
It is not the purpose of this book to trace the subsequent history of
Christianity, especially the later history of Christianity; which involves
controversies of which I hope to write more fully elsewhere. It is devoted only
to the suggestion that Christianity, appearing amid heathen humanity, had all
the character of a unique thing and even of a supernatural thing. It was not like
any of the other things; and the more we study it the less it looks like any of
them. But there is a certain rather peculiar character which marked it
henceforward even down to the present moment, with a note on which this
book may well conclude.
I have said that Asia and the ancient world had an air of being too old to die.
Christendom has had the very opposite fate. Christendom has had a series of
revolutions and in each one of them Christianity has died. Christianity has died
many times and risen again; for it had a God who knew the way out of the
grave. But the first extraordinary fact which marks this history is this: that
Europe has been turned upside down over and over again; and that at the end
of each of these revolutions the same religion has again been found on top.
The Faith is always converting the age, not as an old religion but as a new
religion. This truth is hidden from many by a convention that is too little
noticed. Curiously enough, it is a convention of the sort which those who
ignore it claim especially to detect and denounce. They are always telling us
that priests and ceremonies are not religion and that religious organisation can
be a hollow sham, but they hardly realise how true it is. It is so true that three
or four times at least in the history of Christendom the whole soul seemed to
have gone out of Christianity; and almost every man in his heart expected its
end. This fact is only masked in medieval and other times by that very official
religion which such critics pride themselves on seeing through. Christianity
remained the official religion of a Renaissance prince or the official religion of
an eighteenth-century bishop, just as an ancient mythology remained the
official religion of Julius Caesar or the Arian creed long remained the official
religion of Julian the Apostate. But there was a difference between the cases of
Julius and of Julian; because the Church had begun its strange career. There
was no reason why men like Julius should not worship gods like Jupiter for
ever in public and laugh at them for ever in private. But when Julian treated
Christianity as dead, he found it had come to life again. He also found,
incidentally, that there was not the faintest sign of Jupiter ever coming to life
again. This case of Julian and the episode of Arianism is but the first of a
series of examples that can only be roughly indicated here. Arianism, as has
been said, had every human appearance of being the natural way in which that
particular superstition of Constantine might be expected to peter out. All the
ordinary stages had been passed through; the creed had become a respectable
thing, had become a ritual thing, had then been modified into a rational thing;
and the rationalists were ready to dissipate the last remains of it, just as they do
to-day. When Christianity rose again suddenly and threw them, it was almost
as unexpected as Christ rising from the dead. But there are many other
examples of the same thing, even about the same time. The rush of
missionaries from Ireland, for instance, has all the air of an unexpected
onslaught of young men on an old world, and even on a Church that showed
signs of growing old. Some of them were martyred on the coast of Cornwall;
and the chief authority on Cornish antiquities told me that he did not believe
for a moment that they were martyred by heathens but (as he expressed it with
some humour) 'by rather slack Christians.'
Now if we were to dip below the surface of history, as it is not in the scope of
this argument to do, I suspect that we should find several occasions when
Christendom was thus to all appearance hollowed out from within by doubt
and indifference, so that only the old Christian shell stood as the pagan shell
had stood so long. But the difference is that in every such case, the sons were
fanatical for the faith where the fathers had been slack about it. This is obvious
in the case of the transition from the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation.
It is obvious in the case of a transition from the eighteenth century to the many
Catholic revivals of our own time. But I suspect many other examples which
would be worthy of separate studies.
The Faith is not a survival. It is not as if the Druids had managed somehow to
survive somewhere for two thousand years. That is what might have happened
in Asia or ancient Europe, in that indifference or tolerance in which
mythologies and philosophies could live for ever side by side. It has not
survived; it has returned again and again in this Western world of rapid change
and institutions perpetually perishing. Europe, in the tradition of Rome, was
always trying revolution and reconstruction; rebuilding a universal republic.
And it always began by rejecting this old stone and ended by making it the
head of the corner; by bringing it back from the rubbish-heap to make it the
crown of the capitol. Some stones of Stonehenge are standing and some are
fallen; and as the stone falleth so shall it lie. There has not been a Druidic
renaissance every century or two, with the young Druids crowned with fresh
mistletoe, dancing in the sun on Salisbury Plain. Stonehenge has not been
rebuilt in every style of architecture from the rude round Norman to the last
rococo of the Baroque. The sacred place of the Druids is safe from the
vandalism of restoration.
But the Church in the West was not in a world where things were too old to
die; but in one in which they were always young enough to get killed. The
consequence was that superficially and externally it often did get killed; nay, it
sometimes wore out even without getting killed. And there follows a fact I find
it somewhat difficult to describe, yet which I believe to be very real and rather
important. As a ghost is the shadow of a man, and in that sense the shadow of
life, so at intervals there passed across this endless life a sort of shadow of
death. It came at the moment when it would have perished had it been
perishable. It withered away everything that was perishable. If such animal
parallels were worthy of the occasion we might say that the snake shuddered
and shed a skin and went on, or even that the cat went into convulsions as it
lost only one of its nine-hundred-and-ninety-nine lives. It is truer to say, in a
more dignified image, that a clock struck and nothing happened; or that a bell
tolled for an execution that was everlastingly postponed.
What was the meaning of all that dim but vast unrest of the twelfth century;
when, as it has been so finely said, Julian stirred in his sleep? Why did there
appear so strangely early, in the twilight of dawn after the Dark Ages, so deep
a scepticism as that involved in urging nominalism against realism? For
realism against nominalism was really realism against rationalism, or
something more destructive than what we call rationalism. The answer is that
just as some might have thought the Church simply a part of the Roman
Empire, so others later might have thought the Church only a part of the Dark
Ages. The Dark Ages ended as the Empire had ended, and the Church should
have departed with them, if she had been also one of the shades of night. It
was another of those spectral deaths or simulations of death. I mean that if
nominalism had succeeded, it would have been as if Arianism had succeeded,
it would have been the beginning of a confession that Christianity had failed.
For nominalism is a far more fundamental scepticism than mere atheism. Such
was the question that was openly asked as the Dark Ages broadened into that
daylight that we call the modern world. But what was the answer? The answer
was Aquinas in the chair of Aristotle, taking all knowledge for his province;
and tens of thousands of lads down to the lowest ranks of peasant and serf,
living in rags and on crusts about the great colleges, to listen to the scholastic
philosophy.
What was the meaning of all that whisper of fear that ran round the west under
the shadow of Islam, and fills every old romance with incongruous images of
Saracen knights swaggering in Norway or the Hebrides? Why were men in the
extreme west, such as King John if I remember rightly, accused of being
secretly Moslems, as men are accused of being secretly atheists? Why was
there that fierce alarm among some of the authorities about the rationalistic
Arab version of Aristotle? Authorities are seldom alarmed like that except
when it is too late. The answer is that hundreds of people probably believed in
their hearts that Islam would conquer Christendom; that Averroes was more
rational than Anselm; that the Saracen Culture was really, as it was
superficially, a superior culture. Here again we should probably find a whole
generation, the older generation, serve doubtful and depressed and weary. The
coming of Islam would only have been the coming of Unitarianism a thousand
years before its time. To many it may have seemed quite reasonable and quite
probable and quite likely to happen. If so, they would have been surprised at
what did happen. What did happen was a roar like thunder from thousands and
thousands of young men, throwing all their youth into one exultant countercharge,
the Crusades. It was the sons of St. Francis, the Jugglers of God,
wandering singing over all the roads of the world; it was the Gothic going up
like a flight of arrows; it was the waking of the world. In considering the war
of the Albigensians, we come to the breach in the heart of Europe and the
landslide of a new philosophy that nearly ended Christendom for ever. In that
case the new philosophy was also a very new philosophy; it was pessimism. It
was none the less like modern ideas because it was as old as Asia; most
modern ideas are. It was the Gnostics returning; but why did the Gnostics
return? Because it was the end of an epoch, like the end of the Empire; and
should have been the end of the Church. It was Schopenhauer hovering over
the future; but it was also Manichaeus rising from the dead; that men might
have death and that they might have it more abundantly.
It is rather more obvious in the case of the Renaissance, simply because the
period is so much nearer to us and people know so much more about it. But
there is more even in that example than most people know. Apart from the
particular controversies which I wish to reserve for a separate study, the period
was far more chaotic that those controversies commonly imply. When
Protestants call Latimer a martyr to Protestantism, and Catholics reply that
Campion was a martyr to Catholicism, it is often forgotten that many who
perished in such persecutions could only be described as martyrs to atheism or
anarchism or even diabolism. That world was almost as wild as our own; the
men wandering about in it included the sort of man who says there is no God,
the sort of man who says he is himself God, the sort of man who says
something that nobody can make head or tail of. If we could have the
conversation of the age following the Renaissance, we should probably be
shocked by its shameless negations. The remarks attributed to Marlowe are
probably pretty typical of the talk in many intellectual taverns. The transition
from Pre-Reformation to Post-Reformation Europe was through a void of very
yawning questions; yet again in the long run the answer was the same. It was
one of those moments when, as Christ walked on the water, so was
Christianity walking in the air.
But all these cases are remote in date and could only be proved in detail. We
can see the fact much more clearly in the case when the paganism of the
Renaissance ended Christianity and Christianity unaccountably began all over
again. But we can see it most clearly of all in the case which is close to us and
full of manifest and minute evidence; the case of the great decline of religion
that began about the time of Voltaire. For indeed it is our own case, and we
ourselves have seen the decline of that decline. The two hundred years since
Voltaire do not flash past us at a glance like the fourth and fifth centuries or
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In our own case we can see this oftrepeated
process close at hand; we know how completely a society can lose its
fundamental religion without abolishing its official religion; we know how
men can all become agnostics long before they abolish bishops. And we know
that also in this last ending, which really did look to us like the final ending,
the incredible thing has happened again; the Faith has a better following
among the young men than among the old. When Ibsen spoke of the new
generation knocking at the door, he certainly never expected that it would be
the church-door.
At least five times, therefore, with the Arian and the Albigensian, with the
Humanist sceptic, after Voltaire and after Darwin, the Faith has to all
appearance gone to the dogs. In each of these five cases it was the dog that
died. How complete was the collapse and how strange the reversal we can only
see in detail in the case nearest to our own time.
A thousand things have been said about the Oxford Movement and the parallel
French Catholic revival; but few have made us feel the simplest fact about it;
that it was a surprise. It was a puzzle as well as a surprise; because it seemed
to most people like a river turning backwards from the sea and trying to climb
back into the mountains. To have read the literature of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries is to know that nearly everybody had come to take it for
granted that religion was a thing that would continually broaden like a river,
till it reached an infinite sea. Some of them expected it to go down in a
cataract of catastrophe, most of them expected it to widen into an estuary of
equality and moderation; but all of them thought its returning on itself a
prodigy as incredible as witchcraft. In other words, most moderate people
thought that faith like freedom would be slowly broadened down, and some
advanced people thought that it would be very rapidly broadened down, not to
say flattened out. All that world of Guizot and Macaulay and the commercial
and scientific liberality was perhaps more certain than any men before or since
about the direction in which the world is going. People were so certain about
the direction that they only differed about the pace. Many anticipated with
alarm, and a few with sympathy, a Jacobin revolt that should guillotine the
Archbishop of Canterbury or a Chartist riot that should hang the parsons on
the lampposts. But it seemed like a convulsion in nature that the Archbishop
instead of losing his head should be looking for his mitre; and that instead of
diminishing the respect due to parsons we should strengthen it to the respect
due to priests. It revolutionised their very vision of revolution; and turned their
very topsyturveydom topsyturvey.
In short, the whole world being divided about whether the stream was going
slower or faster, became conscious of something vague but vast that was going
against the stream. Both in fact and figure there is something deeply disturbing
about this, and that for an essential reason. A dead thing can go with the
stream, but only a living thing can go against it. A dead dog can be lifted on
the leaping water with all the swiftness of a leaping hound; but only a live dog
can swim backwards. A paper boat can ride the rising deluge with all the airy
arrogance of a fairy ship, but if the fairy ship sails up stream it is really rowed
by the fairies. And among the things that merely went with the tide of apparent
progress and enlargement there was many a demagogue or sophist whose wild
gestures were in truth as lifeless as the movement of a dead dog's limbs
wavering in the eddying water; and many a philosophy uncommonly like a
paper boat, of the sort that it is not difficult to knock into a cocked hat. But
even the truly living and even life-giving things that went with that stream did
not thereby prove that they were living or life-giving. It was this other force
that was unquestionably and unaccountably alive; the mysterious and
unmeasured energy that was thrusting back the river. That was felt to be like
the movement of some great monster; and it was none the less clearly a living
monster because most people thought it a prehistoric monster. It was none the
less an unnatural, an incongruous, and to some a comic upheaval; as if the
Great Sea Serpent had suddenly risen out of the Round Pond--unless we
consider the Sea Serpent as more likely to live in the Serpentine. This flippant
element in the fantasy must not be missed, for it was one of the clearest
testimonies to the unexpected nature of the reversal. That age did really feel
that a preposterous quality in prehistoric animals belonged also to historic
rituals; that mitres and tiaras were like the horns or crests of antediluvian
creatures; and that appealing to a Primitive Church was like dressing up as a
Primitive Man.
The world is still puzzled by that movement; but most of all because it still
moves. I have said something elsewhere of the rather random sort of
reproaches that are still directed against it and its much greater consequences;
it is enough to say here that the more such critics reproach it the less they
explain it. In a sense it is my concern here, if not to explain it, at least to
suggest the direction of the explanation; but above all, it is my concern to
point out one particular thing about it. And that is that it had all happened
before; and even many times before.
To sum up, in so far as it is true that recent centuries have seen an attenuation
of Christian doctrine, recent centuries have only seen what the most remote
centuries have seen. And even the modern example has only ended as the
medieval and pre-medieval examples ended. It is already clear, and grows
clearer every day, that it is not going to end in the disappearance of the
diminished creed; but rather in the return of those parts of it that had really
disappeared. It is going to end as the Arian compromise ended, as the attempts
at a compromise with Nominalism and even with Albigensianism ended. But
the point to seize in the modern case, as in all the other cases is that what
returns is not in that sense a simplified theology; not according to that view a
purified theology; it is simply theology. It is that enthusiasm for theological
studies that marked the most doctrinal ages; it is the divine science. An old
Don with D. D. after his name may have become the typical figure of a bore;
but that was because he was himself bored with his theology, not because he
was excited about it. It was precisely because he was admittedly more
interested in the Latin of Plautus than in the Latin of Augustine, in the Greek
of Xenophon than in the Greek of Chrysostom. It was precisely because he
was more interested in a dead tradition than in a decidedly living tradition. In
short, it was precisely because he was himself a type of the time in which
Christian faith was weak. It was not because men would not hail, if they could,
the wonderful and almost wild vision of a Doctor of Divinity.
There are people who say they wish Christianity to remain as a spirit. They
mean, very literally, that they wish it to remain as a ghost. But it is not going
to remain as a ghost. What follows this process of apparent death is not the
lingerings of the shade; it is the resurrection of the body. These people are
quite prepared to shed pious and reverential tears over the Sepulchre of the
Son of Man; what they are not prepared for is the Son of God walking once
more upon the hills of morning. These people, and indeed most people, were
indeed by this time quite accustomed to the idea that the old Christian candlelight
would fade into the light of common day. To many of them it did quite
honestly appear like that pale yellow flame of a candle when it is left burning
in daylight. It was all the more unexpected, and therefore all the more
unmistakable, that the seven branched candle-stick suddenly towered to
heaven like a miraculous tree and flamed until the sun turned pale. But other
ages have seen the day conquer the candle-light and then the candle-light
conquer the day. Again and again, before our time, men have grown content
with a diluted doctrine. And again and again there has followed on that
dilution, coming as out of the darkness in a crimson cataract, the strength of
the red original wine. And we only say once more to-day as has been said
many times by our fathers: `Long years and centuries ago our fathers or the
founders of our people drank, as they dreamed, of the blood of God. Long
years and centuries have passed since the strength of that giant vintage has
been anything but a legend of the age of giants. Centuries ago already is the
dark time of the second fermentation, when the wine of Catholicism turned
into the vinegar of Calvinism. Long since that bitter drink has been itself
diluted; rinsed out and washed away by the waters of oblivion and the wave of
the world. Never did we think to taste again even that bitter tang of sincerity
and the spirit, still less the richer and the sweeter strength of the purple
vineyards in our dreams of the age of gold. Day by day and year by year we
have lowered our hopes and lessened our convictions; we have grown more
and more used to seeing those vats and vineyards overwhelmed in the waterfloods
and the last savour and suggestion of that special element fading like a
stain of purple upon a sea of grey. We have grown used to dilution, to
dissolution, to a watering down that went on for ever. But 'Thou hast kept the
good wine until now.'
This is the final fact, and it is the most extraordinary of all. The faith has not
only often died but it has often died of old age. It has not only been often
killed but it has often died a natural death; in the sense of coming to a natural
and necessary end. It is obvious that it has survived the most savage and the
most universal persecutions from the shock of the Diocletian fury to the shock
of the French Revolution. But it has a more strange and even a more weird
tenacity; it has survived not only war but peace. It has not only died often but
degenerated often and decayed often; it has survived its own weakness and
even its own surrender. We need not repeat what is so obvious about the
beauty of the end of Christ in its wedding of youth and death. But this is
almost as if Christ had lived to the last possible span, had been a white-haired
sage of a hundred and died of natural decay, and then had risen again
rejuvenated, with trumpets and the rending of the sky. It was said truly enough
that human Christianity in its recurrent weakness was sometimes too much
wedded to the powers of the world; but if it was wedded it has very often been
widowed. It is a strangely immortal sort of widow. An enemy may have said at
one moment that it was but an aspect of the power of the Caesars; and it
sounds as strange to-day as to call it an aspect of the Pharaohs. An enemy
might say that it was the official faith of feudalism; and it sounds as
convincing now as to say that it was bound to perish with the ancient Roman
villa. All these things did indeed run their course to its normal end; and there
seemed no course for the religion but to end with them. It ended and it began
again.
'Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.' The
civilisation of antiquity was the whole world: and men no more dreamed of its
ending than of the ending of daylight. They could not imagine another order
unless it were in another world. The civilisation of the world has passed away
and those words have not passed away. In the long night of the Dark Ages
feudalism was so familiar a thing that no man could imagine himself without a
lord: and religion was so woven into that network that no man would have
believed they could be torn asunder. Feudalism itself was torn to rags and
rotted away in the popular life of the true Middle Ages; and the first and
freshest power in that new freedom was the old religion. Feudalism had passed
away, and the words did not pass away. The whole medieval order, in many
ways so complete and almost cosmic a home for man, wore out gradually in its
turn and here at least it was thought that the words would die. They went forth
across the radiant abyss of the Renaissance and in fifty years were using all its
light and learning for new religious foundations, new apologetics, new saints.
It was supposed to have been withered up at last in the dry light of the Age of
Reason; it was supposed to have disappeared ultimately in the earthquake of
the Age of Revolution. Science explained it away; and it was still there.
History disinterred it in the past; and it appeared suddenly in the future. Today
it stands once more in our path; and even as we watch it, it grows.
If our social relations and records retain their continuity, if men really learn to
apply reason to the accumulating facts of so crushing a story, it would seem
that sooner or later even its enemies will learn from their incessant and
interminable disappointments not to look for anything so simple as its death.
They may continue to war with it, but it will be as they war with nature; as
they war with the landscape, as they war with the skies. 'Heaven and earth
shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.' They will watch for it to
stumble; they will watch for it to err; they will no longer watch for it to end.
Insensibly, even unconsciously, they will in their own silent anticipations fulfil
the relative terms of that astounding prophecy; they will forget to watch for the
mere extinction of what has so often been vainly extinguished; and will learn
instinctively to look first for the coming of the comet or the freezing of the
star.
==Conclusion: The Summary Of This Book==
I have taken the liberty once or twice of borrowing the excellent phrase about
I have taken the liberty once or twice of borrowing the excellent phrase about
an Outline of History; though this study of a special truth and a special error
an Outline of History; though this study of a special truth and a special error

Latest revision as of 14:04, 6 February 2008

VI. The Five Deaths of the Faith The Everlasting Man
Conclusion and Appendices
written by Gilbert Keith Chesterton



Conclusion: The Summary Of This Book

I have taken the liberty once or twice of borrowing the excellent phrase about an Outline of History; though this study of a special truth and a special error can of course claim no sort of comparison with the rich and many-sided encyclopedia of history, for which that name was chosen. And yet there is a certain reason in the reference: and a sense in which the one thing touches and even cuts across the other. For the story of the world as told by Mr. Wells could here only be criticised as an outline. And, strangely enough, it seems to me that it is only wrong as an outline. It is admirable as an accumulation of history; it is splendid as a store-house or treasure of history; it is a fascinating disquisition on history; it is most attractive as an amplification of history; but it is quite false as an outline of history. The one thing that seems to me quite wrong about it is the outline; the sort of outline that can really be a single line, like that which makes all the difference between a caricature of the profile of Mr. Winston Churchill and of Sir Alfred Mond. In simple and homely language, I mean the things that stick out; the things that make the simplicity of a silhouette. I think the proportions are wrong; the proportions of what is certain as compared with what is uncertain, of what played a great part as compared with what played a smaller part, of what is ordinary and what is extraordinary, of what really lies level with an average and what stands out as an exception.

I do not say it as a small criticism of a great writer, and I have no reason to do so; for in my own much smaller task I feel I have failed in very much the same way. I am very doubtful whether I have conveyed to the reader the main point I meant about the proportions of history, and why I have dwelt so much more on some things than others. I doubt whether I have clearly fulfilled the plan that I set out in the introductory chapter; and for that reason I add these lines as a sort of summary in a concluding chapter. I do believe that the things on which I have insisted are more essential to an outline of history than the things which I have subordinated or dismissed. I do not believe that the past is most truly pictured as a thing in which humanity merely fades away into nature, or civilisation merely fades away into barbarism, or religion fades away into mythology, or our own religion fades away into the religions of the world. In short I do not believe that the best way to produce an outline of history is to rub out the lines. I believe that, of the two, it would be far nearer the truth to tell the tale very simply, like a primitive myth about a man who made the sun and stars or a god who entered the body of a sacred monkey. I will therefore sum up all that has gone before in what seems to me a realistic and reasonably proportioned statement; the short story of mankind.

In the land lit by that neighbouring star, whose blaze is the broad daylight, there are many and very various things motionless and moving. There moves among them a race that is in its relation to others a race of gods. The fact is not lessened but emphasised because it can behave like a race of demons. Its distinction is not an individual illusion, like one bird pluming itself on its own plumes; it is a solid and a many-sided thing. It is demonstrated in the very speculations that have led to its being denied. That men, the gods of this lower world, are linked with it in various ways is true; but it is another aspect of the same truth. That they grow as the grass grows and walk as the beasts walk is a secondary necessity that sharpens the primary distinction. It is like saying that a magician must after all have the appearance of a man; or that even the fairies could not dance without feet. It has lately been the fashion to focus the mind entirely on these mild and subordinate resemblances and to forget the main fact altogether. It is customary to insist that man resembles the other creatures. Yes; and that very resemblance he alone can see. The fish does not trace the fish-bone pattern in the fowls of the air; or the elephant and the emu compare skeletons. Even in the sense in which man is at one with the universe it is an utterly lonely universality. The very sense that he is united with all things is enough to sunder him from all.

Looking around him by this unique light, as lonely as the literal flame that he alone has kindled, this demigod or demon of the visible world makes that world visible. He sees around him a world of a certain style or type. It seems to proceed by certain rules or at least repetitions. He sees a green architecture that builds itself without visible hands; but which builds itself into a very exact plan or pattern, like a design already drawn in the air by an invisible finger. It is not, as is now vaguely suggested, a vague thing. It is not a growth or a groping of blind life. Each seeks an end; a glorious and radiant end, even for every daisy or dandelion we see in looking across the level of a common field. In the very shape of things there is more than green growth; there is the finality of the flower. It is a world of crowns. This impression, whether or no it be an illusion, has so profoundly influenced this race of thinkers and masters of the material world, that the vast majority have been moved to take a certain view of that world. They have concluded, rightly or wrongly, that the world had a plan as the tree seemed to have a plan; and an end and crown like the flower. But so long as the race of thinkers was able to think, it was obvious that the admission of this idea of a plan brought with it another thought more thrilling and even terrible. There was someone else, some strange and unseen being, who had designed these things, if indeed they were designed. There was a stranger who was also a friend; a mysterious benefactor who had been before them and built up the woods and hills for their coming, and had kindled the sunrise against their rising, as a servant kindles a fire. Now this idea of a mind that gives a meaning to the universe has received more and more confirmation within the minds of men, by meditations and experiences much more subtle and searching than any such argument about the external plan of the world. But I am concerned here with keeping the story in its most simple and even concrete terms; and it is enough to say here that most men, including the wisest men, have come to the conclusion that the world has such a final purpose and therefore such a first cause. But most men in some sense separated themselves from the wisest men, when it came to the treatment of that idea. There came into existence two ways of treating that idea, which between them made up most of the religious history of the world. The majority, like the minority, had this strong sense of a second meaning in things; of a strange master who knew the secret of the world. But the majority, the mob or mass of men, naturally tended to treat it rather in the spirit of gossip. The gossip, like all gossip, contained a great deal of truth and falsehood. The world began to tell itself tales about the unknown being or his sons or servants or messengers. Some of the tales may truly be called old wives' tales; as professing only to be very remote memories of the morning of the world; myths about the baby moon or the half-baked mountains. Some of them might more truly be called travellers' tales; as being curious but contemporary tales brought from certain borderlands of experience; such as miraculous cures or those that bring whispers of what has happened to the dead. Many of them are probably true tales; enough of them are probably true to keep a person of real commonsense more or less conscious that there really is something rather marvellous behind the cosmic curtain. But in a sense it is only going by appearances; even if the appearances are called apparitions. It is a matter of appearances--and disappearances. At the most these gods are ghosts; that is, they are glimpses. For most of us they are rather gossip about glimpses. And for the rest, the whole world is full of rumours, most of which are almost avowedly romances. The great majority of the tales about gods and ghosts and the invisible king are told, if not for the sake of the tale, at least for the sake of the topic. They are evidence of the eternal interest of the theme; they are not evidence of anything else, and they are not meant to be. They are mythology or the poetry that is not bound in books-- or bound in any other way.

Meanwhile the minority, the sages or thinkers, had withdrawn apart and had taken up an equally congenial trade. They were drawing up plans of the world; of the world which all believed to have a plan. They were trying to set forth the plan seriously and to scale. They were setting their minds directly to the mind that had made the mysterious world; considering what sort of a mind it might be and what its ultimate purpose might be. Some of them made that mind much more impersonal than mankind has generally made it; some simplified it almost to a blank; a few, a very few, doubted it altogether. One or two of the more morbid fancied that it might be evil and an enemy; just one or two of the more degraded in the other class worshipped demons instead of gods. But most of these theorists were theists: and they not only saw a moral plan in nature, but they generally laid down a moral plan for humanity. Most of them were good men who did good work: and they were remembered and reverenced in various ways. They were scribes; any their scriptures became more or less holy scriptures. They were law-givers; and their tradition became not only legal but ceremonial. We may say that they received divine honours, in the sense in which kings and great captains in certain countries often received divine honours. In a word, wherever the other popular spirit, the spirit of legend and gossip could come into play, it surrounded them with the more mystical atmosphere of the myths. Popular poetry turned the sages into saints. But that was all it did. They remained themselves; men never really forgot that they were men, only made into gods in the sense that they were made into heroes. Divine Plato, like Divus Caesar, was a title and not a dogma. In Asia, where the atmosphere was more mythological, the man was made to look more like a myth, but he remained a man. He remained a man of a certain social class or school of men, receiving and deserving great honour from mankind. It is the order or school of the philosophers; the men who have set themselves seriously to trace the order across any apparent chaos in the vision of life. Instead of living on imaginative rumours and remote traditions and the tail-end of exceptional experiences about the mind and meaning behind the world, they have tried in a sense to project the primary purpose of that mind a priori. They have tried to put on paper a possible plan of the world; almost as if the world were not yet made.

Right in the middle of all these things stands up an enormous exception. It is quite unlike anything else. It is a thing final like the trump of doom, though it is also a piece of good news; or news that seems too good to be true. It is nothing less than the loud assertion that this mysterious maker of the world has visited his world in person. It declares that really and even recently, or right in the middle of historic times, there did walk into the world this original invisible being; about whom the thinkers make theories and the mythologists hand down myths; the Man Who Made the World. That such a higher personality exists behind all things had indeed always been implied by all the best thinkers, as well as by all the most beautiful legends. But nothing of this sort had ever been implied in any of them. It is simply false to say that the other sages and heroes had claimed to be that mysterious master and maker, of whom the world had dreamed and disputed. Not one of them had ever claimed to be anything of the sort. Not one of their sects or schools had even claimed that they had claimed to be anything of the sort. The most that any religious prophet had said was that he was the true servant of such a being. The most that any visionary had ever said was that men might catch glimpses of the glory of that spiritual being; or much more often of lesser spiritual beings. The most that any primitive myth had even suggested was that the Creator was present at the Creation. But that the Creator was present at scenes a little subsequent to the supper-parties of Horace, and talked with tax-collectors and government officials in the detailed daily life of the Roman Empire, and that this fact continued to be firmly asserted by the whole of that great civilisation for more than a thousand years-- that is something utterly unlike anything else in nature. It is the one great startling statement that man has made since he spoke his first articulate word, instead of barking like a dog. Its unique character can be used as an argument against it as well as for it. It would be easy to concentrate on it as a case of isolated insanity; but it makes nothing but dust and nonsense of comparative religion.

It came on the world with a wind and rush of running messengers proclaiming that apocalyptic portent, and it is not unduly fanciful to say that they are running still. What puzzles the world, and its wise philosophers and fanciful pagan poets, about the priests and people of the Catholic Church is that they still behave as if they were messengers. A messenger does not dream about what his message might be, or argue about what it probably would be; he delivers it as it is. It is not a theory or a fancy but a fact. It is not relevant to this intentionally rudimentary outline to prove in detail that it is a fact; but merely to point out that these messengers do deal with it as men deal with a fact. All that is condemned in Catholic tradition, authority, and dogmatism and the refusal to retract and modify, are but the natural human attributes of a man with a message relating to a fact. I desire to avoid in this last summary all the controversial complexities that may once more cloud the simple lines of that strange story; which I have already called, in words that are much too weak, the strangest story in the world. I desire merely to mark those main lines and specially to mark where the great line is really to be drawn. The religion of the world, in its right proportions, is not divided into fine shades of mysticism or more or less rational forms of mythology. It is divided by the line between the men who are bringing that message and the men who have not yet heard it, or cannot yet believe it.

But when we translate the terms of that strange tale back into the more concrete and complicated terminology of our time, we find it covered by names and memories of which the very familiarity is a falsification. For instance, when we say that a country contains so many Moslems, we really mean that it contains so many monotheists; and we really mean, by that, that it contains so many men; men with the old average assumption of men--that the invisible ruler remains invisible. They hold it along with the customs of a certain culture and under the simpler laws of a certain law-giver; but so they would if their law-giver were Lycurgus or Solon. They testify to something which is a necessary and noble truth; but was never a new truth. Their creed is not a new colour; it is the neutral and normal tint that is the background of the many-coloured life of man. Mahomet did not, like the Magi, find a new star; he saw through his own particular window a glimpse of the great grey field of the ancient starlight. So when we say that the country contains so many Confucians or Buddhists, we mean it contains so many pagans whose prophets have given them another and rather vaguer version of the invisible power; making it not only invisible but almost impersonal. When we say that they also have temples and idols and priests and periodical festivals, we simply mean that this sort of heathen is enough of a human being to admit the popular element of pomp and pictures and feasts and fairy-tales. We only mean that Pagans have more sense than Puritans. But what the gods are supposed to be, what the priests are commissioned to say, is not a sensational secret like what those running messengers of the Gospel had to say. Nobody else except those messengers has any Gospel; nobody else has any good news; for the simple reason that nobody else has any news.

Those runners gather impetus as they run. Ages afterwards they still speak as if something had just happened. They have not lost the speed and momentum of messengers; they have hardly lost, as it were, the wild eyes of witnesses. In the Catholic Church, which is the cohort of the message, there are still those headlong acts of holiness that speak of something rapid and recent; a selfsacrifice that startles the world like a suicide. But it is not a suicide; it is not pessimistic; it is still as optimistic as St. Francis of the flowers and birds. It is newer in spirit than the newest schools of thought; and it is almost certainly on the eve of new triumphs. For these men serve a mother who seems to grow more beautiful as new generations rise up and call her blessed. We might sometimes fancy that the Church grows younger as the world grows old. For this is the last proof of the miracle; that something so supernatural should have become so natural. I mean that anything so unique when seen from the outside should only seem universal when seen from the inside. I have not minimised the scale of the miracle, as some of our wilder theologians think it wise to do. Rather have I deliberately dwelt on that incredible interruption, as a blow that broke the very backbone of history. I have great sympathy with the monotheists, the Moslems, or the Jews, to whom it seems a blasphemy; a blasphemy that might shake the world. But it did not shake the world; it steadied the world. That fact, the more we consider it, will seem more solid and more strange. I think it a piece of plain justice to all the unbelievers to insist upon the audacity of the act of faith that is demanded of them. I willingly and warmly agree that it is, in itself, a suggestion at which we might expect even the brain of the believer to reel, when he realised his own belief. But the brain of the believer does not reel; it is the brains of the unbelievers that reel. We can see their brains reeling on every side and into every extravagance of ethics and psychology; into pessimism and the denial of life; into pragmatism and the denial of logic; seeking their omens in nightmares and their canons in contradictions; shrieking for fear at the far-off sight of things beyond good and evil, or whispering of strange stars where two and two make five. Meanwhile this solitary thing that seems at first so outrageous in outline remains solid and sane in substance. It remains the moderator of all these manias; rescuing reason from the Pragmatists exactly as it rescued laughter from the Puritans. I repeat that I have deliberately emphasised its intrinsically defiant and dogmatic character. The mystery is how anything so startling should have remained defiant and dogmatic and yet become perfectly normal and natural. I have admitted freely that, considering the incident in itself, a man who says he is God may be classed with a man who says he is glass. But the man who says he is glass is not a glazier making windows for all the world. He does not remain for after ages as a shining and crystalline figure, in whose light everything is as clear as crystal.

But this madness has remained sane. The madness has remained sane when everything else went mad. The madhouse has been a house to which, age after age, men are continually coming back as to a home. That is the riddle that remains; that anything so abrupt and abnormal should still be found a habitable and hospitable thing. I care not if the sceptic says it is a tall story; I cannot see how so toppling a tower could stand so long without foundation. Still less can I see how it could become, as it has become, the home of man. Had it merely appeared and disappeared, it might possibly have been remembered or explained as the last leap of the rage of illusion, the ultimate myth of the ultimate mood, in which the mind struck the sky and broke. But the mind did not break. It is the one mind that remains unbroken in the break-up of the world. If it were an error, it seems as if the error could hardly have lasted a day. If it were a mere ecstasy, it would seem that such an ecstasy could not endure for an hour. It has endured for nearly two thousand years; and the world within it has been more lucid, more level-headed, more reasonable in its hopes, more healthy in its instincts, more humorous and cheerful in the face of fate and death, than all the world outside. For it was the soul of Christendom that came forth from the incredible Christ; and the soul of it was common sense. Though we dared not look on His face we could look on His fruits; and by His fruits we should know Him. The fruits are solid and the fruitfulness is much more than a metaphor; and nowhere in this sad world are boys happier in apple-trees, or men in more equal chorus singing as they tread the vine, than under the fixed flash of this instant and intolerant enlightenment; the lightning made eternal as the light.

Appendix I. On Prehistoric Man

On re-reading these pages I feel that I have tried in many places and with many words, to say something that might be said in one word. In a sense this study is meant to be superficial. That is, it is not meant as a study of the things that need to be studied. It is rather a reminder of the things that are seen so quickly that they are forgotten almost as quickly. Its moral, in a manner of speaking, is that first thoughts are best; so a flash might reveal a landscape; with the Eiffel Tower or the Matterhorn standing up in it as they would never stand up again in the light of common day. I ended the book with an image of everlasting lightning; in a very different sense, alas, this little flash has lasted only too long. But the method has also certain practical disadvantages upon which I think it well to add these two notes. It may seem to simplify too much and to ignore out of ignorance. I feel this especially in the passage about the prehistoric pictures; which is not concerned with all that the learned may learn from prehistoric pictures, but with the single point of what anyone could learn from there being any prehistoric pictures at all. I am conscious that this attempt to express it in terms of innocence may exaggerate even my own ignorance. Without any pretence of scientific research or information, I should be sorry to have it thought that I knew no more than what was needed, in that passage, of the states into which primitive humanity has been divided. I am aware, of course, that the story is elaborately stratified; and that there were many such stages before the Cro-Magnon or any peoples with whom we associate such pictures. Indeed recent studies about the Neanderthal and other races rather tend to repeat the moral that is here most relevant. The notion noted in these pages of something necessarily slow or late in the development of religion, will gain little indeed from these later revelations about the precursors of the reindeer picture-maker. The learned appear to hold that, whether the reindeer picture could be religious or not, the people that lived before it were religious already; burying their dead with the significant signs of mystery and hope. This obviously brings us back to the same argument; an argument that is not approached by any measurement of the earlier man's skull. It is little use here to compare the head of the man with the head of the monkey, if it certainly never came into the head of the monkey to bury another monkey with nuts in his grave to help him towards a heavenly monkey house. Talking of skulls, I am also aware of the story of the Cro-Magnon skull that was much larger and finer than a modern skull. It is a very funny story; because an eminent evolutionist, awakening to a somewhat belated caution, protested against anything being inferred from one specimen. It is the duty of a solitary skull to prove that our fathers were our inferiors. Any solitary skull presuming to prove that they were superior is felt to be suffering from swelled head.

Appendix II. On Authority and Accuracy

In this book which is merely meant as a popular criticism of popular fallacies, often indeed of very vulgar errors, I feel that I have sometimes given an impression of scoffing at serious scientific work. It was however the very reverse of my intentions. I am not arguing with the scientist who explains the elephant, but only with the sophist who explains it away. And as a matter of fact the sophist plays to the gallery, as he did in ancient Greece. He appeals to the ignorant, especially when he appeals to the learned. But I never meant my own criticism to be an impertinence to the truly learned. We all owe an infinite debt to the researches, especially the recent researches, of single minded students in these matters; and I have only professed to pick up things here and there from them. I have not loaded my abstract argument with quotations and references, which only make a man look more learned than he is; but in some cases I find that my own loose fashion of allusion is rather misleading about my own meaning. The passage about Chaucer and the Child Martyr is badly expressed; I only mean that the English poet probably had in mind the English saint; of whose story he gives a sort of foreign version. In the same way two statements in the chapter on Mythology follow each other in such a way that it may seem to be suggested that the second story about monotheism refers to the Southern Seas. I may explain that Atahocan belongs not to Australasian but to American savages. So in the chapter called "The Antiquity of Civilisation," which I feel to be the most unsatisfactory, I have given my own impression of the meaning of the development of Egyptian monarchy too much, perhaps, as if it were identical with the facts on which it was formed as given in works like those of Professor J. L Myres. But the confusion was not intentional; still less was there any intention to imply, in the remainder of the chapter, that the anthropological speculations about races are less valuable than they undoubtedly are. My criticism is strictly relative; I may say that the pyramids are plainer than the tracks of the desert; without denying that wiser men than I may see tracks in what is to me the trackless sand.