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Page:Wittgenstein - The Blue and Brown Books.djvu/47

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might have tried to copy it and not succeeded; or you : might have drawn an ellipse with a totally different intention, and it ' happened to be like the one you should have copied. So what do you do when you try to copy the ellipse? Well, you look at it, draw some-dung on a piece of paper, perhaps measure what you have drawn, perhaps you curse if you find it doesn't agree with the model; or perhaps you say "I am going to copy this ellipse" and Just draw an ellipse like it. There are an endless variety of actions and words, having a family likeness to each other, which we call "trying to copy".

Suppose we said "that a picture is a portrait of a particular object consists in its being derived from that object in a particular way". Now it is easy to describe what we should call processes of deriving a picture from an object (roughly speaking, processes of projection). But there is a peculiar difficulty about admitting that any such process is what we call "intentional representation". For describe whatever process (activity) of projection we may, there is a way of reinterpreting this projection. Therefore -- one is tempted to say -- such a process can never be the intention itself. For we could always have intended : the opposite by reinterpreting the process of projection. Imagine this case: You give someone an order to walk in a certain direction by pointing or by drawing an arrow which points in the direction. Suppose drawing arrows is the language in which generally we give such an order. Couldn't such an order be interpreted to mean that the man who gets it is to walk in the direction opposite to that of the arrow? This could obviously he done by adding to our arrow some symbols which we might call "an interpretation". It is easy to imagine a case in which, say to deceive someone, we might make an arrangement that an order should be carried out in the sense opposite to its normal one. The symbol which adds the interpretation to our original arrow could, for instance, be another arrow. Whenever we interpret a symbol . in one way or another, the interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one.

Now we might say that whenever we give someone an order by showing him an arrow, and don't do it 'mechanically' (without thinking), we mean the arrow in one way or another. And this process of meaning, of whatever kind it may be, can be represented by another

arrow (pointing in the same or the opposite sense to the first). In this picture which we make of "meaning and saying' it is essential that we should imagine the processes of saying and meaning to take place in two different spheres.