This is an archive copy of wikilivres.ca as of 18 February 2017 (from the WikiTeam dump). The original site is closed.

Page:Wittgenstein - The Blue and Brown Books.djvu/48

Free texts and images.
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has not been proofread

Is it then correct to say that no arrow could be the meaning, as every arrow could be meant the opposite way? --Suppose we write down the scheme of saying and meaning by a column of arrows one below the other.

→

←

→

Then if this scheme is to serve our purpose at all, it must show as which of the three levels is the level of meaning. I can, e.g., make a Scheme with three levels, the bottom level always being the level of meaning. But adopt whatever model or scheme you may, it will have a bottom level, and there will be no such thing as an interpretation of that. To say in this case that every arrow can still, be interpreted would only mean that I could always make a different model of saying and meaning which had one more level than the one I am using.

Let us put it in this way: -- What one wishes to say is: "Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn't be capable of inter pretation. It is the last interpretation." Now I assume that you take the meaning to be a process accompanying the saying, and that it is translatable into, and so far equivalent to, a further sign. You have therefore further to tell me what you take to be the distinguishing mark between a sign and the meaning. If you do so, e.g., by saying that the meaning is the arrow which you imagine as opposed to any which you may draw or produce in any other way, you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined.

All this will become clearer if we consider what it is that really happens when we say a thing and mean what we say.-- Let us ask ourselves: If we say to someone "I should be delighted to see you" and mean it, does a conscious process run alongside these words, a process which could itself be translated into spoken words? This will hardly ever be the case.

But let us imagine an instance in which it does happen. Supposing I had a habit of accompanying every English sentence which I said aloud by a German sentence spoken to myself Inwardly. If then, for some reason or other, you call the silent sentence the meaning of the one spoken aloud, the process of meaning accompanying the process of saying would be one which could itself be translated into outward signs. Or, before any sentence which we say aloud we say its meaning (whatever it