"Isn't it queer that in Europe we should be able to mean someone who is in America?"-- If someone had said "Napoleon was crowned in 1804", and we asked him "Did you mean the man who won the battle of Austerlitz?" he might say "Yes, I meant him". And the use of the past tense "meant" might make it appear as though the idea of Napoleon having won the battle of Austerlitz must have been present in the man's mind when he said that Napoleon -was crowned in 1804.
Someone says, "Mr. N. will come to see me this afternoon"; I ask "Do you mean him?" pointing to someone present, and he answers "Yes". In this conversation a connection was established between the word "Mr. N." and Mr. N. But we are tempted to think that while my friend said, "Mr. N. will come to see me", and meant what he said, his mind must have made the connection.
This is partly what makes us think of meaning or thinking as a peculiar mental activity; the word "mental" indicating that we mustn't expect to understand how these things work.
What we said of thinking can also be applied to imagining. Someone says, he imagines King's College on fire. We ask him: "How do you know that it's King's College you imagine on fire? Couldn't it be a different building, very much like it? In fact, is your imagination so absolutely exact that there might not be a dozen buildings whose representation your image could be?"-- And still you say: "There's no doubt I imagine King's College and no other building". But can't saying this be making the very connection we want? For saying it is "like writing the words "Portrait of Mr. So-and-so" under a picture. It might have been that while you imagined King's College on fire you said the words "King's College Is on fire". But in very many cases you certainly don't speak explanatory words in your mind while you have the image. And consider, even if you do, you ar not .going the whole way from your image to King's College, but only .to the words "King's College". The connection between these words and King's College was, perhaps, made at another rime.
The fault which in all our reasoning about these matters we are inclined to make is to think that images and experiences of all sorts, which are in some sense closely connected with each other, must be present in our mind at the same time. If we sing a tune we know by heart, or say the alphabet, the notes or letters seem to hang together, and each seems to draw the next after it, as though they were a string of pearls